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INTRODUCTION
Michael Polanyi was born in Budapest, March 12, 1891.

His

education took place in Budapest and later in Berlin, where he
remained from 1923 until 1933 as a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute for Physical Chemistry.

In 1933 he was made Professor

of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University, Manchester.

His

interests gradually widened to include Social Studies and Philosophy, and in 1948 he was made Professor of Social Studies at
Manchester.

As Gifford Lectur(;:r at Aberdeen, 1951-1952, he de-

veloped thoughts which seven years later were to emerge in his
central philosophical work, Personal Knowledge.
Polanyi has been influenced by Bergson and Dilthey, and by
Existentialism in general.

The American Pragmatists, and es-

pecially Dewey, have also had an obvious effect on him.

The

influence of the theories of Gestalt Psychology are evident in
his work.

Finally, his analysis of themes such as knowledge and

freedom draw to a large extent on his long experience as a
physical scientist and a member of the SCil;!l:tific community.
The main thesis of Personal

Knowle~e

and the ,:cntral theme

running through much of his philosophical writing is the need for
1

2

a more adequate, post-critical theory of knowledge.

While

science and the critical movement have brought with them accomplishments of tremendous value to man, nonetheless, an overemphasis on the critical process combined with an epistemological
ideal of strict scientific detachment and objectivity threatens
to lead the present age into; ihilism, the destruction of all
meaning and value.

Gradually, religion, moraliti, art and the

social sciences are losing trust and being labeled "unscientific,tI
while the more exact sciences threaten to become the gods of the
age.

Polanyi would hope that a more adequate theory of knowledge

will enable modern man to trust his own abilities to know in a
wide range of fields, extending far beyond the limited realms of
physical science.
Knowledge, for Polanyi, is essentially an act of "comprehension."

It is above all a positive, a-critical activity.

The

negative, judicial, or critical element in knowledge is of great
value but there are limits to its use.

If

overempl~sized

it can

lead to the destruction of meaning.
The intent of this paper is to
Polanyi's idea of "comprehension. t\

examin~

in some detail

The initial chap!.:er explains

the structure of comprehension in general.

The two succeeding

chapters will examine two activities proper to

~aowledge,

name-

3

1y the use of language and the activity of problem solving, in
an effort to see these

activitii~s

as comprehensive in structure.

The fourth chapter will go on to view the fundamentally a-critical nature of comprehension and the limitations of the critical
element in knowledge.
appropriateness of this
the crisis of the age.

Finally, the last chapter will examine the
re-ev~luation

of knowledge in relation to

I.

flThere arc

into ,rords. II

Tm! 3TRUCTL'RE OF COMPREHENS ION
Wllny

things tllat a man knowu which he cannot put

This might be said to btJ the first principle of

trl1chacl Polanyils theory of knowledgt!.

The phenan-eI.lOD of inef-

fable knowlc.diQ is as old as ,"laD, and FOUllyi i$ far fr(xn

the first to take it into account.

~-.!illg

Artists and men of a creative

bent have attached more tmportance to this intuitive element in
knowledge than have the scientifically inclined.

other philosopher has baco

30

But perhaps no

explicit in making this a central

issue 1n bis approach to knowledge.

In takins this stance, Fo-

luny! is setting himself OVGr against the cartesian ideal of
"clear aQd distinct ideas" and equally against the statement of
the early \<11ttganltcin, HOf what calUlot be said, the1:Qo£ one must

be eilent. H1
~lben

this

a man

u taclt

kno,~.

something and cannot say it. Polanyi calls

knowledsa." Many people know how to ride a bicycle,

yet they could not say fmactly how they do it..

A student may

recognize the difference between a vcry go(d teacher and a medloere teacher..

However, if he tries to draw up a llf,t: of qoo111

•

lM:Lchael Polany!. Persoaa.1 Knowle.. (LondOD: Routledge and
Kegan Ltd., 1958), 87.
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ties which make this man outstanding, the list is not particularly convincing to an outsider.

In a similar way, the connoisseur

knows his wines and the archeologist knows pottery; yet it is
quite another talent for either one of them to be able to spell
out verbally what he knows tacitly.

A mathematician who is noted

for his ability to solve a difficult problem, may be just as remarkable for his clumsiness in trying to explain how he has come
upon the particular solution.

All these are examples of men who

cannot adequately explicitate something, even though they have a
tacit knowledge of the matter.
The basic explanation for this anomaly is found in a distinction between two irreducible types of knowing, subsidiary
knowledge and focal knowledge.
attended to directly.

Some things are known by being

These are satd to be known focally. Other

things are known merely as instruments, while attention is focused on a task at hand.
subsidiary knowledge.

This Polanyi calls instrumental or

In writing a letter, one is not attending

to the pen in his hand but to the effort of composing a message.
Yet, people use the pen correctly.
in using it.

They know what they are doing

The knowledge one has of a pen he is using while

writing a letter is subsidiary knowledge, while the knowledge of
the idea being expressed is focal knowledge.

The distinction

6

between these two fundamental types of knowledge, can also be expressed in terms of parts and a whole.

A person can know the

individual parts of a thing without knowing how they go together
into a whole.

Once the whole is grasped, the parts are seen in

a new way, as contributiDi to the whole.

Then the parts are

known subsidiarily while the whole is the focus of attention.
These two types of knowledge are irreducible and fundamentally different.

When one is attending to a whole and knows its

parts only subsidiarily in terms of the whole, he cannot at the
same time be knowing the parts directly, as entities in themselves.

To emphasize this point, Polanyi casts it in the form

of a logical disjunction:
The mutual exclusiveness of the two kinds of knowing can b
expressed in terms of a logical disjunction. When we know
something by relying on our awareness of it for the purpose of attending to something else (i.e., we know a parti
cular for the purpose of attending to a comprehensive entity to which it contributes), we cannot at the same time
not rely on it for this purpose -- as would necessarily be
tne case if we attended to it exclusively in itself. l
It is now possible to explain Polanyi's basic principle
more fully.

"There are things we know but cannot tell," precise

ly because there are many things which are known only subsidiarily, in terms of the whole to which they contribute.

When a

lMichael POlanyi, "Tacit Knowing," Philosophy Todal, 6
(Winter, 1962), 239-262.
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student appreciates a great teacher, the student may be unable to
make a convincing list of the man's qualities, for the student
has known these particulars only subsidiarily.

Likewise, the

archaeologist may recognize pottery without being able to specify
the particulars by which he recognized it, because he knew these
particulars only subsidiarily_
This then, for Polanyi, is the structure of all knowledge.
Particulars,

kno'~

subsidiarily, are tacitly integrated around a

focus of attention to form a "comprehensive" whole.

Thus Polanyi

refers to all knowledge as "comprehensive. 1I
The Body:
The unique nature of the body is the foundation for the
structure of knowledge outlined above.
most entirely in a subsidiary manner.
a complex system of
conBc!c~~ness,

mus~ular

A man knows his body alBodily activity involves

activities, at different levels of

which are known subsidiarily in terms of the fo-

cal purpose of the activity_

When someone approaches a friend,

he is not focusing upon the smile on his own face, nor the muscular movements involved in extending his hand and moving his
legs.

All these bodily activities are known subsidiarily, as he

focuses upon his going-to-meet-this-person.

'~hus

our awareness

of ourselves in action is related to our objectives, in the same

8

way as our awareness of the parts of a comprehensive

en~ity

is

related to our attention fixed on that entity."l
The body is unique in that it is not seen as external to
the person.
body.

He looks out upon the whole external world from his

An examination of this process of externalizing things

other than one's body will show more precisely the subsidiary
nature of the body.

Polanyi does this in some detail:

Our appreCiation of the externality of objects lying out
side our body, in contrast to parts of our own body, relies
on our subsidiary awareness of processes within our body.
Externality is clearly defied only if we can examine an
external object deliberately, localizing it clearly in
space outside. But when 1 look at something, I rely for my
localization of it in space on a slight difference between
the two images thrown on my retina, on the accommodation of
the eyes, on the convergence of their axis and the effort
of muscular contraction controlling the eye motion, supplemented by impulses received from the labyrinth, which vary
according to the pOSition of my head in space. Of all
these 1 become aware only in terms of my localization of
the object 1 am gazing at; and in this sense 1 may be said
to be subsidiarily aware of them. 2
Bodily existence then, is the foundation of the structure
of knowledge.
the

pr~e

The subsidiary awareness we have of our body is

analogate for other examples of subsidiary awareness

and makes them possible.

Polanyi refers to bodily existence as

lMichael Polanyi, "Clues to an Understanding of Mind and
Body," The Scientist Speculates, ed. I.J. Good (London: Heinemann, 1962), 7I-78.
2Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 59.
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"indwelling. "

One dwells within his body in knowing at.d using

external things.

To speak of dwelling within the body is another

way of saying that the body is known subsidiarily in all bodily
activities.
activity.

It is known not as an object but as an instrument of
A person pours htmself into an instrument or dwells

within an instrument to achieve some purpose or objective.

In

the same way a person dwells within his own body to achieve his
bodily purposes and objectives.

This notion of indwelling can

then be extended to all instances of subsidiary knowledge.

When

one moves from knowledge of parts in themselves, to the knowledge of them as contributing to a whole, he can be said to
"interiorize" or dwell within these particulars in comprehending
the whole.

'~he

act of comprehending a whole i8 an interioriza-

tion of its parts, which makes us dwell in them in a way that is
logically similar to the way we dwell in our body~"l
Knowledge--practical and theoretical:
It is now possible to briefly scan some different levels

0

knowledge to see the structure of comprehension at work in them.
From the beginning, Polanyi refuses to separate skilful doing
IMichael Polanyi, "Science and Religion: Separate Dimensions or Common Ground?," mimeographed for private circulation
only.
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(practical knowledge) from theoretical knowing.

They

~omplement

each other in most areas of knowledge, and they share the similar structure of comprehension.
Skill is a performance, achieved by the observance of a
set of rules which are not known as such to the person following
them.

The swimmer or cyclist has mastered his skill, and in

performing it he coordinates a number of muscular and perceptual
activities in a very regulated way, without in the least being
able to specify the activities or the rules by which he works.
S~i1arly

the pianist performs a highly complicated skill.

While focusing his attention upon the music, he is only subsidiarily aware of his fingers; yet, he is exercising perfect control over them.

If he should change the focus of attention from

the music to his fingers, in an attempt to substitute a focal
control for subsidiary control, he would make mistakes and his
performance would break down.

Likewise, the conductor of an

orchestra does not concentrate upon the individual movements of
his body, but rather On the task at hand.

He is only subsidi-

arily aware of his own movements.
Very often skills are performed with tools.
example of a golfer.
ball.

Consider the

He concentrates his attention upon the

His whole effort is to hit the ball well.

He is only

11

his attention from the ball to the club he would proba7Jly miss
the ball entirely.

The same dilemma appears in tennis.

One

must concentrate on hitting the ball cleanly, and let a subsidiary awareness control the racket.
It is obvious that the subsidiary awareness which one has
of a tool used in a skilful performance, is very much akin to
the awareness of his own body.

Of course a tool can be focused

upon in itself, but when it is taken precisely as a tool it becomes an extension of the body.

A tool can be clearly seen as

an extension of the body if one considers how the impacts in the
hand can be displaced and felt to take place at the outer
reaches of the tool itself:
Think of the use of tools.. In hammering in a nail we attend to the hammer as it hits the nail, but we do so of
course by being aware of the way the handle of the hammer
impinges on our palm. The rower is aware of the strain in
his hands and arms only in terms of the blades tearing the
water. The blind man groping his way by means of a stick
is aware of its impact on his palm in terms of the way the
outer end of the stick hits on objects in front of him.
When using a probe the surgeon feels the point at which it
tip touches the walls of a cavity he is exploring. In all
these cases, the thing to which we are attending is situated at some distance from the things yo the awareness of
which we rely for attending to them •••

--------_._---------

-

~

.,.

._-- - - -

1m.chael Polanyi, "History and Hope: An Analysis of Our
Age," Lectures delivered at the Thomas Jefferson Center for
Studies in Political Economy, University of Virginia, 1961.
Mimeographed for private circulation only, 32-33.
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If tools then are assimilated as an extension of the body,
one can be said to "interiorize" or "dwell within" a tool while
performing a skill.

T'be tool along with the body is known sub-

sidiarily, while attention 1s focused on the purpose of the
skill.

This is why the carpenter cannot explicitate all that

goes into his skill,

no~

can the apprentice learn carpentry by

reading a book.
The act of perception itself, which is fundamental both
in skilful performances and in higher scientific areas, is a
comprehensive achievement.

The one doing the perceiving, sub-

ordinates a number of perceptual clues, known subsidiarily, to
a focus.

There are many subsidiary particulars which contribute

to any act of perception:
••• all these things which go on inside our eyes and other
parts of our body in the process of seeing an object, and
the memories which enter into our seeing from the back of
our minds, as well as the remote bits of the visual field
from the corner of our eyes, are things on our awareness
of which we rely for seeing an object in a particular way.
In this sense we undoubtedly know these thing! but we have
little or no knowledge of them in themselves.
Perception and skill are both an important part of science
An expert who can identify 800,000 species of insects, relies on

a highly trained power of perception.

He obviously knows many

IMichael Polanyi, ItFaith and Reason,tf Journal of Religion,
41 (October, 1961), 237-247.
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things subsidiarily which he could not explicitate.

He could of

course explain much, but much would have to remain unsaid.. This
is why zoology and botany cannot simply be learned from books,
any more than medicine.

Many hours of practical laboratory work,

under a teacher, must be given to these and other branches of
the natural sciences.

Skill in perceiving and testing must be

acquired, and a person must become aware of a multitude of clues
and particulars that cannot be exhaustively identified:
••• testing has itself to be learned along with the art of
recognizing the physiognomies of the tested objects. We
must jointly learn to be skilful testers as well as expert
knowers. Actually these are only two different and inseparable processes of comprehension. Expert knowing
relies on a comprehension of clues, while skilful examination relies on a combination of dexterous motions for
tracing these clues. l
Besides skill and perception, there is a purely theoretical aspect of knowledge which might not at first seem to share
the structure of comprehension.

Theoretical science involves

working with a symbolic system of some type, whether mathematicalor linguistic.

Polanyi contends that man's use of a symbo-

lic system has the same structure as the other levels of knowledge explored thus far.

A word or mathematical symbol or

musical notation can be observed in itself, as a mark on paper
lMichael Polany1, "The Terry Lectures," Yale University,
1962. M1me
aphed for private circulation with additions.
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or a sound in the air, an entity of its own.

However, to observe

it in this way is to make it linguistically or mathematically or
musically meaningless.

This destruction of meaning is similar to

the confusion which arises if the pianist focuses upon the movement of his hands or if the carpenter focuses upon the hammer in
his hand.
"reads" it.

One does not "observe" a symbolic statement, one
To read he must assimilate the symbolic notation sub-

sidiarily. interiorizing it and dwelling within it, in an effort
to "comprehend tt its meaning.

Attention is focused on meaning

while individual symbols are known subsidiarily.

Thus a symbolic

system or statement resembles a tool in that it can be interiorized and can become an extension of the body.

Thus Polanyi says

of Scientific theory:
To rely on a theory for understanding nature is to interiorize it. For we are attending from the theory to things seen
in its light and are aware of the theory, while thus using
it, in terms of the spectacle that it serves to explain.
This is why mathematical theory can be learned only by
practising its application: Its true knowledge lies in our
ability to use it.
Finally, this consideration turns to the level of interpersonal knowledge, which can include all the levels discussed
up to this point.

Generally, it can be said that one person comes

to know snother person's mind or intent by observing his actions
IPolanyi, "Terry Lectures," Lecture I, 14.
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or through direct communication.

The question at issue is whether

inter-personal knowledge and communication

shar~ th~

structure of

comprehension that has been characteristic of other levels.
Consider the case when one man comes to understand the
skilful

per£~nc~

of another man.

As he watches the other man,

he must try to combine mentally the performances which the other
is combining physically_

By mentally dwelling within the particu-

lars of the performance, he observes the same pattern which the
perfot'Dl'ar is trying to produce.
here.

Two kinds of indwelling meet

The performer coordinates his moves by dwelling in them

physically as parts of his own body, while the observer tries to
coordinate them from outside, by,interiorizing them and dwelling
within them as extensions of

~

body.

By such exploratory in-

dwelling a student or apprentice may learn a master's skill.l

In a similar way, chess players may replay games their
master played to see what was in his mind.

Students read books

or study paintings in an effort to read a master's mind.

These

efforts are efforts at interiorization, efforts to dwell within
these particulars in the same way the master dwelt within them
in creating them.

This analysis can easily be extended to

direct communication.

explai~

In listening to another person speak, one

lIbid. Lecture II, 1-2.
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attempts to interiorize the particulars of his speech according to
the same focal meaning which the speaker has.

The particulars are

not just words, but tone and gesture as well.

The same combina-

tion of words may be susceptible of different

m~anings,

that is

If the one listening interiorizes the words

different focuses.

or any other particulars in a manner different from the interiori
zation of the speaker he has misunderstood.

The interiorization

may make perfect sense, but he has failed to understand the mind
of the other person.

In all these cases of inter-personal know-

ledge, the particulars are
meaning~

T\~o

acts of

knO\fl\

subsidiarily in termw of a focal

compreh~nsion

are involved, that of the

sp~aker and that of the l.istener. 1
~}'lsi.!.!._£o!..s~ruc~iye and

Destrueti.!.!:

Mention has been made all along of the unspecifiability of
subsidiarily known particulars.

It is now time to look more

closely at this phenomenon and to examine its implications in the
area of analysis.

Analysis has always been a favorite method for

improvement of skills aDd knowledge at all levels.
~~f!~_,E~'3 _~'!!!!~.~ .~(L'p5!~P:.t.._~.flaws_._~n

A young boy

h.i s bat.ting, ~t~.!!£~~d

lThe "intuitive" elemeDt in all levels of knowledge, especially noticeable on the inter-personal level, is ~xplained by
the unspecifiability of subsidiary knowing, which is involved to
a greater or lesser extent in all cowprehensi\lu.
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tries to correct them by concentrating attent1.on on individual
points such as bi.s fee.t or hands or the angle of his bat.

An

aspiring young actor spends hours practising his gestures before
a mirror.

A coach liill take movies to try to discover and correct

individual fla't-ls in his team's performance.

A student of poetry

tries to enhance apprac1.ation and understa.nding by a careful

verse-by-verse and word-by-word dissection of the text.

A lin-

guist attempts to narrow in on the meaning of words by compiling
long lists of various types of usage.. A scientist checks and rechecks the smallest details of his experiments.

on.

And the list goes

Every area of knowledge uses analysis as part of its method-

ology.
The basic difficulty that analysis faces is in trying to
transform a subsidiary knowledge of particular. and a tacit integration of them into a focal and explicit knowledge.

Since sub-

sidiarily-known particulars exist at different levels of consciousness. samet although subsidiary, are rather eas11y d1scernible while others are

~possible

to specify.

Even those particu-

lars that are discernible may have their meaning destroyed or
distorted by focuslng upon them in analysis:
Usually it 1s not impossible to identify some particulars
of a comprehensive entity, for example some symptoms of a
clinically disanosad disease. But in such cases another
limitation of specifiability becomes apparent, as Gestalt-

18
phychology has amply taught us. Specifiabllity remains incornpl l3ti"! in t\lO ,\Yays. Fir.at, thi'~re is ahmys a r': sic'..le of
particulars left unspecified; and second, even when particulars CRn h~ idcl1ti::ied, isolation ch.lnges their app,:;ar.ance
to some extent. 1

Consider the example of language.
of use.

Language grows up in a context

Through analysis and explicitation correct usage is

spelled out in definitions and grammatical rules.

However defini-

tion is never complete and grammatical rules are subject to further and further qualification.

Such an analysis is a specifying

of particulars which are subsidiarily known in usage.

Usage also

knOW$ D1Ch more of language that cannot be specified.

Definitions

and grammar are only helpful to the person who knows the

lang~~ge.

They can help him develop his knowledge; but they can never rcplace the subsidiary knowing of an infinity of particulars and the
tacit integration of them that takes place in daily usage. 2
Polanyi sees growth in knowledge as a dual movement, from
comprehension to a specification of particulars in analysis and
then reintegration into a

compreh~nsive

knowledge of the 1A1f101e:

As a rule the two kinds of knowing do not completely extinguish each other. We may successfully analyze the
symptoms of a disease and concentrate our attention on
l~u.chael Polanyi, "Knowing and Being," Minds vol. LXX,
No. 280 (October, 1961), 458-470.

2polanyi's theory of language will be explained more fully
in Chapter II.
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its several particulars, and then we may return to our
conception of its general appearance by becoming once more
subsidiarily aware of these particulars as contributing to
the total picture of the disease. Indeed, such an oscillation of detailing and integrating is the royal road f01
deepening our understanding of any comprehensive entity.
The first part of this dual movement, analysis, is open to
grave risks.

An unbridled lucidity can destroy understanding of

complex matters.

In biological sciences one can lose sight of a

pattern or physiognomy by examining its parts under great magnifi
cation. 2
damaging.

In other cases particularization can be irremediably
Meticulous detailing can obscure subjects like history,

literature, or philosophy beyond recall. 3 Even when analysis is
done properly and leads to deeper understanding. it must be reintegrated into a comprehension of the whole if it is to be
fruitful.
Thus the end is similar to the beginning.
structure of knowledge is comprehension.

The fundamental

Even valid analysis

leads back to comprehension, where particulars are known subsidiarily and integrated

tacit~y

in terms of a focal meaning.

Therefore, it is possible to restate the principle with which

-------------_...... ----------------,. -..

lPolanyi, "Faith and Reason," 239-240.
2polanyi, "Terry Lectures," Lecture I, 15.
3Ibid • 15-16.
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this chapter was begun, now with deeper understanding through
analysis. "there are many things which men know but cannot put
into words."

II.

LANGUAGE

The vast superiority of human knowledge over animal intel-

ligence lies in man's ability to invent and use symbolic systems
such as language. l

The universe 1s known through comprehension,

in which particulars are interiorized and tacitly integrated in
terms of a focal meaning..
as extensions

ins.

of

Man dwells within tbese particulars,

his own body, in comprehending thetr jOint mean-

However, a man cannot assimilate a DlOUDtain as part of his

mental life.

A mountain is uDi1D8l1a8eable.

In a suular way man

cannot interiorize tiredness n as part of his mental life, for
redness cannot be gotten hold of.

There are red books and red

drapes, but redoess itself cannot be isolated and in that sense
it is unmanageable.

However J if a mountain and redness are them-

selves unmanageable, the words ''mountain'' anduredness lf are easily
interiorized and used as for comprehending the universe.

Through

the use of words, man is enabled to wderstand a reality which

would otherwise be unmanageable. 2 Thus language is the tool by

--------------------------------------_._------------------2Mic.hael Polanyi, "Words, Conceptions and Science, It The
Twe~t~th C~.~~~l'

September, 1955, p. 259.
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which man comprehends the universe; and by examining language in
some detail it will be possible to see comprehension at work.
The previous chapter examined the phenomenon of a man who
could not say all that he understood.

This chapter will take as

its starting point the opposite phenomenon of one
understand all that he has said.

wilO

cannot

A child will easily fall into

verbal puzzlement over a matter which he is quite capable of
handling in practice.

In this case, the child has became in-

volved in a linguistic fumbling which will later
fuller understanding.

b~

corrected by

There is as well the case of the mathe-

matician working out mathematical conclusions which will later
prove to have relevance and fruitfulness in the field of science.
However, this scientific relevance and fruitfulness are, for the
time being. hidden from him.

Here the mathematician is involved

in a linguistic pioneering which will be followed up by full
understanding.

Both instances, that of the child and that of the

mathematician, point up the power of language to lead a man beyond his present ability to understand all that he is saying.
The phenomenon of a man unable to understand all that he
has said, brings out clearly the two fundamental aspects of
language: 1) language as a formalized system, and 2) language as
a tool for interpreting reality.

As a formalized system it can
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lead a man to conclusions beyond his present ability to understand.

Since it is also a tool for interpreting reality man

faces the question as to whether his conclusions are a true
revelation of reality or more sophistry.l
Corresponding to the two aspects of language, Polanyi distinguishes two types of meaning -- existential meaning and denotative meaning.

The more obvious kind of meaning is denotative

in which one thing (a word) means another thing <an object).
Other things like a tune or a pattern are more prnblematic, for
while they are not meaningless, they have a meaning only in themselves.

They do not stand for something else.

This second type

of meaning Polanyi calls existential.
We may-describe the kind of meaning which a context possesses in itself a,s existential, to distinguish it especially from denotative or more generally, representative
meanina. Inthis sense pure mathematics has an existential meaning~ while a mathematical theory in physics has a
denotative meaning. The meaning of music is mainly exi.stential, that of a portrait more or less representative,
and so on. All kinds of order, whether contrived or
natural, have existential meaning; but contrived order
usually also conveys a message. 2
Language, of course, has both kinds of meaning.

As a formalized

system it has existential meaning; while, as a denotative tool
lpersonal Knowledge, pp. 94-95 •
...

'"

t

10 _ _

2Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 58.
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for interpreting reality it has denotative meaning.

This dual

quality of language is of prime importa.nce to Polanyi; therefore,
this essay will treat each of these a.spects 1n same detail.
LaIliuale, a Formalized System:
Language is not created over night.

Rather, it is the re-

sult of an intelligent effort over a long period of time.

It

arises within a culture, from the attempt of individuals to
communicate with one another.

It acquires richness as the people

grow in depth of feelIng and thought.

It becomes refined and

precise as the culture becomes sophisticated.

Words gather mean-

ing the way a floor gathers dirt, through continued use by many
different people over a long period of time..

Some words are used

by only a small number of people in very special circumstances,
while others are used by all the members of the culture.

Some

words prove useful for a time and eventually die out J while others
are preserved for centuries.
terns.

Words are combined in certain pat-

With time these patterns become somewhat regulated and

are more or less precise.
others remaJ.n.

New patterns are added, some vanish,

When a certain level of culture is reached, dic-

tionaries are written in an attempt to put down on paper the
meanings that words have acquired.

Grammars are written, explici-

tating the patterns of use in terms of linguistic rules.

However,
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dictionaries and grammars become out-dated aa usage changes; and
inevitably new dictionaries and

n~w

grammars appear.

And the

process goes on in an unending stream.
The evolution of language is slow and almost imperceptible.
At a given moment in a culture's development, its language forms
a systematic whole, fairly well defined by current dictionaries
and grammars.

The words and patterns of the language embody an

interpretation of reality which incorporates the beliefs, the
insights, and the values of earlier generations.
Different languages are alternative conclusions arrived at
by the secular gropings of different groups of people at
different periods of history. They sustain alternative
conceptual frameworks, interpreting all things that can be
talked about in terms of somewhat different allegedly recurrent features. The confident use of the nouns, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs, invented and endowed with meaning
by a particular sequence of groping generations, expresses
their particular theory of the nature of things. l
A child, growing up in a culture and learning to speak its laoguage, takes on the way of thinking and the vision of reality
which the language embodies.

He gradually interiorizes it and

dwells within it as an extension of his body.

The language forms

a framework through which he views the world.

This framework

breaks the world into various elements.

The patterns of the

language provide him with rules for reorganizing words, and
IPolanyi, ''Words, Conceptions, and Science," p. 266.
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thereby reorganizing the elements of the world, into new and
different combinations.
In its strict form, the conceptual reorganization of words
according to logical patterns is known as deduction.

This con-

ceptual reorganization takes language as a formalized system
rather than a tool for interpreting reality.

As one progresses

away from ordinary language into more and more precise symbolic
systems, there ar.ises a greater and greater emphasis on the formal and systematic elements over the applicability of the system
to experience.
(1) the descriptive sciences, (2) the exact sciences, (3)
the deductive sciences. It is a sequence of increasing
formalization and symbolic manipulation, combined with
cecreasins contact with experience. Higher degrees of
fOrmB.lization make the statements of a science more precise, its inferences more impersonal ••• ; but every step
towards this ideal is achieved by a progressive sacrifice
of content. The ~nse wealth of living shapes governed
by the descriptive sciences is narrOWed down to bare
pointer-readings for the purpose of the exact sciences,
and experience vanishes altogetherlfrom our direct sight
as we pass on to pure mathematics.
Pure mathematics then is almost totally a formalized
tem.

SY8-

The symbols of pure mathematics, like chessmen, do not

necessarily stand for anything denoted by them in experience.
Primarily, they stand for the use that can be made of them,
IPolany1, Personal Knowledge, p. 86.
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according to known rules.

The mathematical symbol embodies the

conception of its possible operations, just as a piece in chess
embodies the conception of the moves which it may make.

Thus

pure mathematics lies almost entirely in the category of existential meaning as opposed to denotative meaning.
The surprisingly varied terms in Which systems of algebra
or geometry can be interpreted, demonstrate the tenuousness
of their denotative functions. They do not refer to particular things and may be altogether empty categories, well
defined, but applying to nothing. • •••• These self-contained
systems of pure mathematics may tell us something which is
important, without primarily refer~ing to anything outside
themselves. 1
It is now appropriate to ask whether the understanding and
use of a formalized system involves comprehension.
claim that it does.

Polanyi would

It is true that a logical deduction in mathe.

matics is a formally articulated sat of steps which produces a
conclusion totally implied in the premises.

Moreover, these

steps procede according to a set of rules which have been at
least partially articulated.

The truth of the deduction does not

depend in any way upon anything which it denotes in experience,
but simply on its internal consistency.

Nonetheless, the under-

standing of a logical deduction has an informal, tacit and subsidiary element and must be comprehended as a meaningful whole.
To begin with, mathematical symbols, though they do not delIbid.
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note anything in experience, must still be interiorized and known
subsidiarily.

To look at a mathauatical symbol in itself, as a

mark on paper, renders it meaningless.

The meaning it has within

mathematics, and therefore within any given deduction, must be

known focally and comprehensively, while the symbol itself is
known subsidiarily.
Not only 1s the understanding of the meaning of mathemati-

cal symbols a comprebensive achievement; but more important, the
grasping of a mathematical deduction is itself an act of comprehension, and thus tacit 1n character.

A mathematical deduction

may be articulated, but unless the proof is understood the arti-

culation is worthless.

Certainly, no teacher would be satisfied

with giving his students a chain of formulae connected by formal
operations, and a student has not gained anything by learning
such

sequeuc~by

rote.

Unless the student has interiorized the

articulated proof and grasped it as a comprehensive whole, he has
not understood the deduction.
To look at a mathematical proof by merely verify inc each
consecutive step -- says Poincare -- is like watching a
game of cbess, noting only that each step obeys the rules
of chess. The least that is required is a grasp of the
logical sequence as a purposeful procedure: what Poincare
describes as "the something which constitutes the unity of
the demonstrati.an .. 11

It is this

:~something"

-- perilaps in

the forvt of an outline embodying the main steps in the
proof -- for which the stude1lt will grope, if baffled by a
sequence of operations which convey no sense to him, and it
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is again this outline, embodying the general principle or
general structure of the mathematical proof, which will
be remembered when the details of the proof are forgotten. 1
Thus, the individual articulated steps of a deduction are interiorized subsidiarily, while the main lines of the proof are a succession of tacitly integrated wholes, Which are themselves tacitly integrated into the larger whole which is the entire deduction.
The analysis of putemathematics has pointed up clearly the
nature of a formalized system.

It is characteristic of a for ..

malized system to have existential meaning, and in a pure state
such as mathematics it is devoid of denotative meaning.

A for-

malized system is understood through a tacit and comprehensive
grasp of its internal unity and consistency.
When a formalized system is referred to experience an entire1y new element is brought in.

Now the system is given a

denotative reference, over and above its existential meaning.
This occurs for instance when mathematics is used in science.
An

attempt is made to tie mathematical symbolism down to certain

elements of experience, and the fruitfulness of such an attempt
is abundantly clear in the history of modern science.
guage there is an even greater reference to experience.

In 1&nHere one

finds an immensely complex integration of these two aspects of
lPo1anyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 118-119.
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language often come into conflict, and no easy harmony can be

established between them.

The reason for this conflict will

come clear in the following discussion which taltes up the appli-

cation of the formalized system of language to reality.
Lang~e,

a Tool for ~nte!pretin§ Re.a~it,.:

The formalized system of a given language has grown up
among a people trying to organize the world in which they live.
People have named things and some of the names have remained and
grown in meaning.

They have cORte to use words according to cer-

tain patterns, and some of the patterns have caught on.

Gradu-

ally the system was built up, not arbitrarily but by intelligent
people trying to understand and express their common experience.
At a given moment the system 1s a formalized whole.
it this way is an abstraction.

lor a system of language is al-

ways in process J changing, developing.
tion to experience.

But to see

It has a threefold rela-

It relates to the experience of past gene-

rations who have formed the language and given it meaning (denotative and existential).

It relates to present experience in

that the people who use it look upon it as a true interpretation
of reality_

ence.

And, very importantly, it relates to future experi-

It promises to fit future experience into its categories

and open up fruitful areas for future investigation.

This
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future reference of a linguistic system Polanyi calls its "power
of anticipation."
Moreover, by b<dng prepaI'ed to speak in our language on
future occasions we anticipate its applicability to future experiences, which tl1e expect to be identifiable in
terms of the classes accredited by our language. These
expectations form a theory of the universe which we keep
testing continuously as we go on talking about things. So
long as we feel that our language classifies things well
we remain satisfied that it is right and we shall continue
to accept the theory of the universe impli.ed 1n our ian··
guage as true. 1

The future reference or power of anticipation which a
linguistic system has is not unique.

A

similar power of antici-

pation can be found in less articulate activities of animals and
men.

Fo~

instance,perception gradually builds up a ha,bitual way

of seeing things, a framework which divides reality into identifiable objects.

These perceptual categories not only apply to

present experience, they also anticipate
future percoptions in a

s~ilar

way.

beiI~

able to structure

Thus linguistic anticipa-

tian is akin to that of lower levels.
The power of our conceptions lies in identifying new ins~ances of certain things that we know.
This function of
our conceptual framework is akin to that of our perceptive
framework, which enables us to see ever new objects as
such, and to that of our appetites, which enables us to
reco8nize ever new things as satisfying to them. It appears likewise akin to the power o£ practical skills, over
keyed up to meet new situations. We may comprise this
lPolanyi, ''Words, Conceptions, and Science, U p. 258.
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set of faculties, our conceptions and skills, our
perceptual framework and our drives, in one comprehensive
power of anticipation. l

~~ole

A linguistic
not static.

syst~,

with its power of anticipation, is

It is in process.

If it anticipates being able to

structure future experience, it does not anticipate doing this
without itself being changed in the process.

When a language is

still young it interprets a narrow range of reality in a rather
clumsy fashion.

This is sat1.factory, for the peopleoaina it

have not reached a level of sophistication to need a precise
language.

As a culture's experience widens with time its lan-

guase changes» takes on new meanings, aequires new words t uses

old words more precisely and with greater depth of meaning.
change is continual.

Thi.

Thus a l.inguistic system in meeting future

experience will not 8imply bring this new experience under its
old categories and patterns, but will also adapt its categorie •
. and patterns to the newness of the experience.

This adaptation

and modification of the linguistic system as it meets new experiences takes place on three levels: 1) in the life of the child
learning to speak, 2) in science, and 3) in the everyday use of
laagua,ge.
1) The child uses words clumsily.

He pOints at the wash
.........

l!bid. 259-260.
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fluttcril'tg in the td.lld and calla it ''weathe·c:.- U and hu calle tho

this

clothespins usmall weathcr U and the windmill ftbig weather. n

clumsiness in his ltmgt::lgc t"efl':!ct:l a ::llt!utal confusion (Tiler tbe
things he is talktng about..

His uac of language will be corrected

simultaneously '11th his understanding of the difference between
weather, 114Sb, windmills and clothesp1ns.

This type of aropllli

toward l1aguistie and mental clarity 18 not canf1ned to the chil4.
Most

110'0

have a comparatively safe knowledge of a. certa1D uumbal'.

of frequently Wlad words *

many
as

~er t

half~understocd ~xpres.iona

ODe

this Q.UCll!U8 is aurrourad.ed by

which they seldom

use. As 1001

does not have to use th4se worela. or can use ths 10

situations which do not briDg out tbe confusion involved, there le
ao stimulous to seek greater cla:ity..

However. with time. the

child. who calls the wash "weather. U ami the man who is forced to

use Wf-understood wor:t!a, will arope faa: p:eater clari.ty.

In

attaf.a1t!& this clutt,. t oW aDd confused concept1cma will be r ....

pUcfo1d 11$

~t'

&ad clearer

ODe..

Here, an :l.nd1vldual·. I1D&ula-

etc system 18 beiDa modified at the frinaes I where half-underat
words are replaced by full, understood WOI'ds.

Itt goina througb

this process. one comes to 3J!'cater ccmpetence in the uae of a
larger number of words, and at the same time

clearer KDOWledge of reality.
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A cultur(;: is much lil..c a cbild in developing 1ts 1insuif:ltic

system.

It bC3ins by naming things rather awkwardly.

When con-

fusion t'csuit.a from the use of some of its conceptions, it is
forced to find better wordflj to clear up the confusion.

This pro-

cess goes on continually as a culture strUigles to understand
reality more fully, and from -this process emerges a caaplex and
formalized linguistic system which expresses the character of the
people and their interpretatiun of reality.
2) The

ty~e

of modification of a linguistic system which

goes on in science is very

s~ilar

to the above case of the child,

a progression from confusion to clearer understanding through a

clarification of terms.

llowever, because of the sophisticated

atmosphere in which it takes place. it is more impressive.

Po lan-

yi cites the example of the atomic theory of chemistry, estab.

lisb.eci by John Dalton in 1808 and generally accepted almost 1m,..
mediately.

E'or the next fifty years, though all scientists used

the theory, its meanins remained obscure:
It came as a revelation to scientists when in 1858 Cannizaro
distinguished precisely the three closely related conceptions of atomic wei&ht, molecular weight and equivalent
weight (weight per valence), which had been us~d until Chen
in an indeterminately interchangeable manner. The appositeness of Cann1zaro's interpretative framework brought new
clarity and coherence into our understanding of chemistry.
Su;:h cl'lrification is irreversible; it is as difficult to
reconstruct today the confused conceptions which chemists
used durina the previOUS half century (and which for example

induced Dalton to reject AvolgadrO' s Law as contr~~y to the
atomic theory of chemistry), as it is to be baffled o~e
more by a puzzle after having discovered ita solution.
Here again one observes a very precise and sophisticated linguistic system changing and being modified by the intelliaent men who

are attempting to mold it into a better and better tool for interpreting reality.
3) Language is constantly being modified in ita everyday
use, Apart from the spur of a particularly acute problem, as it 1s
applied to an ever new and slightly different set of experiences.

This type of gradual and imperceptible modification takes place
both in ordinary life al1d in science.

Every new occasion on which

a word is used 1s slightly different from any previous occasion.
The

~ntire

meaning which the word has acquired through past use

is brought to bear on this Dew situation.

However, the very new-

ness of: the sltuation demands that thewrd be slightly modified
to fj,t the situation.

uIn this cha.nging world, our anticipatory

powers have always to deal with a somewhat unprecedented s1tuatiOll , and they can do so ill at-'maral only by undergoing some meas ...
')

ure of adaptation. H ...
The necessity of continually adapting a lingui$tic system
in bringing it to bear on an ever new reality is, of course. prohlPolanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 107.
2Po1anyi, Personal Knowle3ii. 110.
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lemat1c.

If one appl1es tl» word "owl" to an uaprecedented owl,

'Wiut makes th1.3 more true thl1t1 calling the bird a sparrow. and

adapting

~'a

linguistic system to include this bird as an ex-

ample of "sparrow"?

In otbar ,,1Ot:ds, is not the modification of a

linguistic system to fit an ever new real1ty an arbitrary thins?
Po14n),1 would cla1m, within limits. that this nlOd.lfic.ation

1s a utter of truth and fJl."ror..

If a culture modtf1es its lan-

Buage to fit an ever wider realit1r more adequately, its language
IrOlf'S lnto a truer theory of the unlveraa.
trated in the example of tho owl and the

Dew ktnd of owl an owl» rather than a

This car, be 11lus-

8par'i~0'W':

spa.rr~;,

t'Tbus we call a

because the UIOdlfl-

cation of the eoneepeion of owls by which wa l.nclude tho bird 1ft

question as an 1aultcce af owls IIl.akos sanae; wf.la a modtf1catloa

of our conception of aparrOffls J by \mlcb we would 1nclude thia
btrd as an instance of sparrO"'Jls. maltss l'lODS.m1Se .. n 1 The decision
to call an unprecedented bird an owl ratilert' than a

tacit decision, by which

ODe

Spa1.'"l.'OW

18 a

modifies his la\'\SU4ie, _d a dee1s1OD

wh1eh involves trt.,cth and error.

Because men realize that truth

haass in the balance t they will often argue long a.nd bitter11
about the "use of words.

Polmlyi cites an ax.ampla of this In acienc&.

.. ......

--

ltbid. 111.

In 1932 Urey
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discovered heavy hydrogen (deuteritnn), and described it as a new
"isotope" of hydrogen.

In 1934, at a discussion held by the Royal

Society, Frederic Soddy who had discovered isotopy, objected to
Orey' s use of the 't'l7ord "isotope. II

the isotopes of an element

4S

Soddy had orig1nally defined

chemically inseparable from each

other, and heavy hydrogen was chemically separable from light
hydrogen.
term

Soddy's

"isotop~u

prot~st

was ignored and a new meaning of the

was tacitly accepted.

The new meaning allowed h~avy hydrogen to be included amana
the isotopes of hydrogen: in spite of its unprecedented
property of being chemically separable from its fellow isotopes. Thus the stat8llent "There exists an e1emettt deuterium which is aft lsotoDI'" of hydrogentt uss accepted in a
sense which re.def1'ned the term isotope, so that this statement. which otherwise 'fOUld be false, became true. The new
conception abandoned a previously accepted criterion of isotopy as superficial, and relied instead only on the identity
of mlclear charges f.n isotopes. 1

In all three of the above areas a similar
work.

phenon~n~

is at

Man possesses a formalized system of language, built up

ove'J!' many years,. which must serve him as a tool for interpreting
reality.

In applying this language to an ever new experience, he

not only comes to understand this experience. but he also continues to modify his language, changing the system which has been
handed to him by past generations and building it into an ever
lPolanyl, Pe:r:sonal KnO'l:Yl.ed;e, p. 111.

38

more adequate tool for understanding the universe.
Polanyi cla1mB that this adaptation of language is a tacit
and subsidiary achievement, which explains its often imperceptible
character.

As one learns language J he interiorizes its words and

patterns and the various meanings and connotations which the
idioms of the language can bring about.

In a given Situation, al

these elements J known subsidiarily, are integrated into a unique
focal and comprehensive meaning as he tries to make sense of the

situation in front of him and put this into words.

In the process

of making sense of the situation he adapts many of subsidiary elements of his language to include what is new in the present situation.

The adaptation itself takes place subsidiarily, and the

Whole process of understanding the situation and expressing it is
a comprehensive achievement.
The adaptation of our conceptions, and of the corresponding

use of language to new things that we identify a8 new variants of known kinds of things, is achieved subsidiarily
while our atteDtion is focused on making sense of a situation in front of us. So we do this in the same way in whic
we keep modifying, subsidiarily, our interpretation of sensory clues merely by striving for clear and coherent perception, or enlarging our skills without focally knowing
how, by practising them in ever new situations. The meaning of speech thus keeps changing in the act of groping for
words, without our being focally aware of the change, and
our gropings invent words in tlrlJ manner with a fund of
unspecifiable connotations. Languages are the product of
man' s grapiDS for words in the process of making new conceptual decisions, to be conveyed by words. 1

TIlts treatment of language began with the phenomenon of
1
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a man unable to know all that he had said.

It was claimed that

the phenomenon was due to a verbal speculation which had led the
man to conclusions which were linguistically consistent, but whose
reference to reality was yet obscure.

In the succeeding parts of

the treatment, this split between linguistic consistency (existential meaning) and reference to experience (denotative meaning) was
analyzed in terms of the dual aspect of language.

Language is

both a formalized system and a tool for interpreting reality, As
a formalized system it has its own internal and existential meaning, and can be used for verbal speculation.

As

a tool for inter.

preting reality, the formalized system itself has a denotative
reference, and if the denotative reference of a particular verbal
speculation is obscure, then the above phenomenon can occur.
Also, in applying a linguistic system to reality, the system is
constantly modified to interpret an ever new reality more adequately.

Finally, comprehension is involved at all levels.

Understanding the internal meaning and consistency of a linguistic system is an act of comprehenSion, understanding the denotative meaning of a linguistic system is an act of comprehenSion,
and modifying the linguistic system to denote reality more precisely is an act of comprehension.
Against the background of this analysis of language as a
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cootprehens!ve

ach1.~vement,

philosophy, namely

'~olanyf

tacklas a perennial problt:'m of
Th18 el141>ter will

the problem of univers·itls.

conclude '{d.th a dlsc1.'H,s1on of Polanyi '8 treatment of this topic.

1----:
Univ~!rsals

In considering Polany1's treatment of univt!rsals, two main

questions suggest themselves: 1) The logical difficulty of uniting
a number of things ""bleb differ in every respect under a. a1.ngle

conception or 4 Bingle word: 2) The reality or objectivity of the
classifications desfanated by a universal term.
1) Since the days of Plato men have wrestled ....~th seeming

contradiction involved in using the word ''manu to desi$DAte two
men who ware different in every respect.

This problem cannot be

disca.rded by the claim that one unites two different men under a
811181e term by designatio:; sane feature or aspect which the two

hold in common.

For the pl:'oblem can

DOl"

be restated 1n t"nn8 of

this common aspnet. "How C411 one .efar to an

a8p~et

as •comntOn t

,

when ho is really uniting under a Single tem two aspects which
d1.ffer :from one another in

C!\tery

respect. This problMD :f.s similar

to that of empirical induct1on, where a

8 ins 18

law ie used to ex-

plain experiences whi.cb dUfer 10 every respect.

Polany1 cla:l.m8

that the difficulty involved here 1s that meD are searching

for an

.e!'Rlicl~ Eoce~~.!

fett

fOJ:'lll!D& classlflcati0D8 of objects
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to be designated by a single term.

Because universalizing and

induction are tacit performances, it is ultimately impossible to
obtain such an explicit procedure.
In forming a universal, the

individ~ls

which differ from

one another, are known subsidiarily and integrated tacitly in
terms of their focal meaning.

This focal meaning is expressed by

a word, which thus becomes a universal term.

Thus the formation

of a universal ts an act of comprehension and involves tacit knowiog.

The tacit act by which one integrates the different individ-

uals can never be fully explicitated, as is true of all tacit activity.

This is why Polanyi denies the possibility of finding an

explicit procedure.

By his own acknowledgement of tacit knowledge

he explainS the process of induction and avoids searching for an
explicit justification of it.
In forming a universal, one's tacit powers overcome an apparent contradiction.

Taking two things which differ in every

respect, they integrate them by finding them identical in some
other way.
I

Polanyi tries to throw light on this type of integra-

tion, by pointing to examples on the level of perception where
tacit knowing integrates conflicting clues in various ways •
• • • there is an :hnporta.nt case when conflicting visual clues
are integrated to a true sight. we fuse the two different
pictures of an object cast on the retina of our eyes by
forming its stereoscopic image. Here perception resolves a
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contradiction by revealing a joint ~anit! of conflicting
clues in terms of a .!!!! gualitl. A simi r synthesis is
achieved when we hear a sound as coming from a definite
direction by combining its impacts that reach first one ear
and then the other. This is also what happens in the forma
tion of a general conception. l
Hm~ever,

there is an important difference between the per-

ceptual integration of conflicting clues and the integration of
different objects under a general term.

The difference lies in

the curiously unsubstantial character of the joint meaning in the
universalizing process.

"Compared with ••• stereoscopic images,

general conceptions are abstract, featureless, the focus in terms
of which we are aware of the members of a class appears vague and
almost empty.tt2
Polanyi is not too explicit on the significance of this
empty, or vague, or abstract quality of the universal.

However,

he tries to throw some light on the problem, through the example
of coming to know a human being.

One penetrates gradually to

ever deeper levels of reality which are correspondingly less
tangible.

One first recognizes a man, then discovers what he is

doing, then interprets his motives, and finally forms or reforms
a conception of his personality.

He hints that the vagueness of

lPolanyi, "Tacit Knmrling," 252.

-

2Ibid. 253.
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a universal concept as opposed to a perceptual integration of
conflicting clues is due to a deeper penetration of reality.
" ••• as 't-le move to a deeper, morc cooprehcnslve, understa.nding of

a human being, we tend to pass fran more tangible particulars to
increasingly intangible entities: to entities which are partly
for tMs reason more real ••• ,,1
2) Besides the question of integrating different things

under a single conception, Polanyi takes up the question of the
character of the universal in relation to the class of entities
cla~

it clafms to designate (i.e. in what sense can it
nate an objective class of real entities?).

Two

to desig-

problems are of

interest here: (a) the non-arbitrary character of man's classifying things by general terms; (b) the tacit and changing nature
of these classifications.
(a) At first glance, there would seem to be an infinity of

different possible ways to claSSify things.

Certainly different

cultures have classified things in different '\'lays.

Is it not

then entirely arbitrary whether one calls all blue birds by one
name and all black birds by another, or cnli& .11 birds by a
single name which can in turn be modified by the adjectives blue
or black?

Furthermore, does not this arbitrariness extend to al

IPolanyi, "Tacit Knowing," 253.
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possible classifications of things?
Polanyi would place himself squarely against such u theory
of language.

As

't>1as pointed Qut curlier. language is formed by

intelligent men striving to construct a true theory of the universe.

Different cultures develop different languages, not be-

cause choice of language is purely arbitrary, but because different peoples have different tasks, different personalities, different historles, and different geographical settings.

If differ-

ent cultures are to express themselves intelligently in language,
the languages will necessarily be different.

To suggest that the

AnglO-Saxon peoples, with their own history and setting and personality could have just as well developed a Semitic language as
the. one they actually developed is, for Polany!. a monstrous affront to the intelligence of man.
On a more particular level, if men went about classifying

things arbitrarily, they would produce an infinity of irrelevancies which would completely destroy the possibility of intellectual growth.

For instance, it is ordinarily irrelevant to

classify words by their first letters unless one is compiling a
dictionary or some similar reference list.

It is almost entirely

irrelevant to claSSify words according to their second or third
letters.

Stmilarly, it would be ridiculous to classify birds by
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their number of feathers, even if such a thing WEre possible.
Thus classifications are a matter of truth and error, or life an4
death. l
(b) The above stand puts Polanyi explicitly in the camp of
However, his ideas on the tacit and change-

the metaphyatcians.

able character of universal terms shows his leaning toward pragmatist and existentialist attitudes.

His pOSition can best be

brought out by examining the "three levels of intentions" which he
gives to universal terms.
A universal tera refers first-af-all to a certain number of
easily-identified, common features which are properties of the
class of things named.
They will

be~ssed

These could be called surface properties.

in any definition of the thing classified,

and will be known to anyone at all conversant with the class of
things ia question.
Secondly, the universal term refers to known but not readi-

ly specifiable properties which these entities share.

Such

properties are not completely specifiable because they are known
tacitly and subsidiarily at levels of consciousness that are not
easily penetrated.

If a class has a large range of such tacitly

known properties, it mll lend itself to deeper and deeper analy.
IPolanyi, Personal bowlede, lU... 114.

-
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sis over 101"'..g periods of time.

"""Yords of great human significance

accumulate through the centuries an unfathomable fund of subsidia~ily

k110wn connotations. which we

can bring partly into focus by

reflecting on the use of such words ••• lIenee the fruitfulness of a

Socratic enquiry into the meaning of words like

f

justice I or

'truth' or •courage , • etc. Hl Thus this second level of intentions
explains why one's explicit knowledge of the meaning of a word caa
grow. as he penetrates further into the particulars which he knows

tacitly.

However, since all analysis of tacit knowledge is

incomplet~

this secon.d level of intentions also reveals the limits of def:f.niIt is often pointed out that definition is an unending pro.

tian.

cess, for one can go on to define the words used in the definition
and this process can be repoated to infinity.

Polanyi t s explana-

tion of the incomplete character of definition is compelling.
Words are tools for- :interpreting reality. their meaning built up
through usagQ.
a

Definition is akin to analyzing the skilful use of

tool:
It is the acme as if we studied the motions involved in

us1.ns a baaner effectively with a view to improving our
l~eriag.
For this we must wield a hammer as efficiently
as we can. even while watching our motions to discover the
oost 'way of hammering. Similat:ly. we must use the 'ford
lIbld. l1S.
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"justice," and use it as correctly and thoughtfully as we
can, while watching ourselves doing it, if we want to aaalyse the conditions under which the word properly applies.
We must look intently and discriminatingly through the term
"justice" at justice itself, this being the proper ute of
the term tfjustice, It the use which we want to define.

And just as one can never completely explicitate all the subsidiarily known particulars which contribute to the skill of using a
hammer, so it is impossible ever to completely define a word.
The third level of intentions if formed by the indeterminate
range of anticipations expressed by designating a class of things.
Just as it was earlier noted that a linguistic system anticipates
subsuming future experience into its framework, so a universal
term anticipates many future manifestations of the class which it
designates.

However, it was also pointed out above that as a lin-

guistic framework was applied to future experience, the framework
itself would be modified.

The ease of the universal term is again

Similar, for as more and more experiences are brought under a universal term, the term gathers new meaning and new connotations.
Some

of these newly observed properties will accrue at the first

level of intentions, and will be easily recognized; while others
will accrue at the second level and often will be imperceptible.
Thus it becomes evident that a universal term is meant to
designate a relevant, objective class of entities.
lIbid. 116.

However, with
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time and the newness of experience, these terms gather meaning
and change.

The meaning which they gather can be penetrated more

and more, but can never be exhaustively explicitated.

As always

with Polanyi, language is a comprehensive whole, where subsidiary
particulars are integrated to a focal meaning, and explicit kno,.'I.
ledge is complemented by what is known tacitly.

III. PROBLEM SOLVING
Solving problems and answering questions is a basic activity
which shows up time and again 1.n human living and human knowing.
The child is perplexed over "where babies come from."
struggles far the answers to his math.
how he will make ends meet.

The student

The young husband worries

And as he grows older a man may even

ponder over the existence of God or the meaning of life.

In

scientific circles, new problems constantly lead to new discoveries; while the student of science faces the task of discovering
for himself what science has discovered through the years.

As the

first chapter of this work outlined human knowledge as comprohensive in structure. and the second chapter saw that structure at
work in language. now the present chapter will attempt to bring
out the structure of comprehension in this fundamental activity
of solving problems.
All waking animals exhibit a purposive tension, a readiness
to see and act and make sense of their situation.

The organism

constantly strives to adapt itself to its environment and to
fulfill the needs it feels within that eWJironment.

From this

general striving of the organism there emerges the more specific
process of solving problems.

A person becomes perplexed with an
49
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element of his environment, and this perplexity gives rise to a
tension which will remain until the perplexity is resolved.

This

resolution of the perplexity comes when a new way of perceiving or
acting is found which makes sense of the situation and produces
satisfaction.

Thus the process of solving problems can be divided

into four stages: 1) the problem; 2) the heuristic effort moving
toward a solution; 3) the moment of discovery; 4) the verification
of the discovery.
The Problem:
It would be wrong to describe a problem as absence of knowledge, though it is true that a problem implies a certain absence
of knowledge.

There are myriads of things that a given person is

ignorant of, yet not all of these things are a problem for him.
Rather, a problem is a stage between ignorance and knowledge.

It

is a definite addition to knowledge in that the person has selected a certain area of his·ignorance and grasped it as a gap in
his knowledge.

Furthermore, he has found this gap promising and

he foresees bridging this gap with a solution to his problem.

In

fact, seeing a problem involves seeing the first vague outlines
of the solution, it involves same conception of the solution.
Thus a problem includes a unique balance of the known and the unknown.

Polanyi brings out the elements of the known-unknown in
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some detail.
Different types of problems will involve more or less clear
conceptions of their solutions.

The simplest type of problem is

searching for an object that is lost.

one looks for his

~~en

fountain pen he knows exactly what he expects to find, though he
does not know exactly where he will find it.

He can describe the

pen in exact detail and he may well be able to specify a region
within which it will be found.

In this case the person faced with

the problem has a. fairly exact knowledge of v1bat he is seeking and
how to go about finding it.

Searching for a word to fit a cross-

word puzzle involves a less clear conception.

One may know that

the word has five letters and is much needed in jungle exploration.

These clues in themselves are somewhat vague, and beyond

this vagueness it is not certain that the person involved has seen
the word before.

Moreover, once a suitable word is found it will

remain to be seen whether it fits with the rest of the puzzle as
the precise word intended.

Thus different problems will give rise

to different conceptions of their respective solutions, but every
problem in some

~lay

contains a conception of its solution ..

This "pre-conception" of the solution to a problem becomes
very important in the progress of science.

The scientist cannot

take up every problem that occurs to him.

If he tried to, science
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would soon become cluttered with an infinity of irrelevant details.

Instead, he must attempt to assess the relative value of

different problems and choose from among them those which will
contribute more to the advancement of science.

It 1s only because

he has a pre-conception of the solution to the various problems

that he can make such value judgments; and thes2 value judgments
arc a fundamental instance of the scientist's "skill.1t

ChooSing

a promising scientific problem is an achievement similar to the
connoisseur's ability to distinguish good wine fram poor wine.
To form such estimates of the app=oximate feasibility of yet
unknown prospective procedures, leading to unknown prospective result~~ is the day-to-day responsibility of anyone
~ndertelting independent scientific or technical research.
On such grounds as these he must even compare a number of
different possible sUSS6stions and select from them for
attack the most promiSing problem. Yet I believe that experience shows such a performance to be possible and that it
can be relied upon to function with a conslde=able degree
of reliability.l
The problem, besides including a pre-conception of its solu-

tion, also postulates the existence of that solution.

Just as

appetites such as hunger postulate the existence of something
that will satisfy them, so the intellectual desire that is at
work in a problem postulates the existence of a satisfactory solution.

Even thouSh the solution is something never before encOUDIpolanyi, Personal Kn~~1edge, 124.
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tered, still it is similar to the mislaid fountain pen which exists.

One searches for a solution as if it were there, existing

but hidden.
problems

Thus comparing real problems with the artificial

givl~n

to students, Polanyi makes the statement: "Proble

set to students are of course known to have a solution; but the
belief that there exists a hidden solution wl-Jicb we may be able
find, is essential also in envisaging and working at a yet unsolved prob1em."1
The problem then contains both a pre-conception

of its so-

lution and a promise of the existence of that anticipated solution.

It remains to show how this pre-conception and promise-of-

existence fit tvithin the comprehensive structure of the problem.
It was remarked earlier that seeing a problem is a real
addition to knowledge.

An existing set of facts become a prob-

lem when they begin to be seen as pointing to a unity beyond
themselves.

Up to this point they were seen as isolated facts;

now they are no longer isolated facts, but clues which indicate
a yet-unknown unification.

This switch from being-seen-as-iso-

1atad-facts to being-sean-as-clues is a switch from focal to
subsidiary knowing.

Each of the facts

~re

previously known

lMichael Polanyi, IIProblem Solving," The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, VIII (August! 19~7)J 97.
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focally, as entities in themselves.

As they begin to be inte-

grated as subsidiary elements pointing toward a focus, the problem begins to come into view.

The integration of course remains

incomplete, and the focus remains unknown, until the problem is
solved.
This illustrates the most striking powers of tacit knowing,
owing to which we can focus our attention on the joint mean
ing of particulars, even when the focus to which we are attending has DO tangible center. It represents our capacity
to know a problea. A problem designates a gap within a
constellation of clues pointing toward something unknown. l
Thus a problem baa a comprehensive structure.

A set of dat

begin to be known subsidiarily as clues pointing toward an antici
pated focus.

The problem posits the existence of a solution by

promising a focus in terms of which it will integrate the subsidi
ary elements.

The pre-conception of the solution is the collec-

tion of clues.

This pre-conception is necessarily vague because

the clues are known subsidiarily and the focus remains unknown.
Finally, it becomes evident why only the scientist's "skill" can
choose the valuable problem from the maze of possible problems.
The problem must be assessed in terms of its pre-conception.
This pre-conception is a collection of subsidiarily known clues.
Therefore, the pre-conception cannot be adequately explicitated
lPolanyi, "Tacit Knowing," 255.
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and submitted to close analysis.

If the value of the problem is

to be assessed, this assessment will necessarily be a tacit and
skilful achievement rather than explicit and critical.
The Heuristic Effort:
Along with a problem comes a tension or a desire to find the
solution.

This desire leads a man to ponder, to search, to exper-

iment in an effort to obtain a solution.

A man faced with a prob-

lem may sit down at his desk and take out a pencil and paper.

He

will write for a while, sit back, pace the floor and after a relatively short period of time the solution will come to him.

An-

other man will live with his problem for weeks or years before
hitting upon a solution.

At times he will be quite conscious of

it and concentrate on trying to find a solution, while at other
times it will 11e at the very back of his mind, forgotten or nearly forgotten for the moment.

The question of interest here is

what goes on in the time lapse between the coming of the problem
and the finding of the solution.

To what extent does the man

bring about the solution, and to what extent must he wait for it 1
There are two types of problems admitting of two different
approaches to solvingtbem, namely the systematic approach and
the heuristic approach.
solution.

Some problems may admit of a systematic

If sOInC!one knows his pen 1s somewhere in a given room,
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it is possible to search the room inch by inch until it is found.
If he literally searches every square inch of the room, he is surt
to find the pen.

Similarly, it is conceivable to solve a chess

problem by trying out all possible moves and counter moves.
However, most problems do not in practice admit of such systematic solutions, for the possibilities are far too numerous to
permit individual systematic examination.
The heuristic approach to solving a problem (which is of
prtmAry interest here) consists of alternating active and passive stqes.

The persOft involved begins by setting up the prob-

lem as well as he can, then he "waits attentively" for the bright
idea.

If nothing eomes he tries to set the problem in slightly

different terms, then waits asain.

At times he may feel himself

approaching near a solution, while at other times he may feel
that he has wandered up a blind alley.

Thus the person does not

set the problem up anew each time at random.
sense when

~~ ~~

away from it.

Rather he tries to

moving toward the solution and when he is moving

It is this sense of the approaching solution whicb

enables him to cboose, from a myriad of possible ways of setting
up the problem, those operations which will lead htm to the solution.
I believe that we should ••• acknowledge our capacity both tc
sense the accessibility of a hidden inference fram given
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premisses and to invent transformations of the premisses
which increase the accessibility of the hidden inference.
l-le should recognize that this forknowl~dge bias.;as our
guesses in the right direction, so that their probability
of hitting the mark, which would otherwise be zero, becomes
so high that we can definitely rely on it simply on the
grounds of a student's intelligence; or for higher performances, on the grounds of the special gifts possessed
by the professional ••• l
Thus the ability to sense the nearness of a solution and to sense
the operations that will lead nearer the solution are attributed
to the skill of the one attempting to solve the problem.

It is

stmilar to the cook's ability to know just what is still aeeded
to make the soup taste perfect.
The active stages of the heuristic effort tben consist of
operations upon the problem which bring one nearer and nearer to
its solution.

But what happens during the passive stages, when

one "waits attentively"? There is no activity going on in full
light of consciousness; however, there may well be activity goi
on at subconscious levels.

Besides this there is a more or less

intense concentration upon the problem, a tension and a striving
which reaches out for the solution.
Often the solution to a problem will come at the oddest
moments..

After thinking about it at sOI.1le lensth, one may put

the problem aside for awhile and take up same other activity.
lPolanyi, "Problem Solving," 99-100.
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Often enough

it is during such a period of rest that the answer

will suddenly come.

The only possible explanation for such a

phenomenon is that the integrating activity, in some form or
other, has continued at sub-conscious levels even after the
problem has been put aside.
However, there are passive moments even while one is
intensely preoccupied with trying to solve the problea.
are moments of concentration.

These

There are no conscious operations

being performed, yet somehow during these moments the solution
c~es

closer, or perhaps leaps into view.

Whatever activity

takes place, bUtes place at sub-conscious levels.
scious level there is only attention.

On

the con-

But attention to what?

It must be said that what is attended to in these moments is the
solution itself, the unknown answer, the empty focus, the yet-to
be-grasped.integration.

These are what a person concentrates on

as he waits for the solution.
But ,,:-!1~t is the object of this intensive preoccupation?
Can we concentrate our attention on something we don't
know: Yet this is precisely what 't'iC are told to do: "look
at the unknown! ft says Poly., "Look at the end. Remember
your aim. Do not lose sight of what is required. Keep in
mind what you are working for. Look at the unknown. Look
at the conclusion." No advice could be more emphatic. 1
The heuristic approach to • ..,lving problems then is an ioIPolany1, "Problem Solving," 98.
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telligent (though non-systematic) striving toward an integration
of particulars in terms of a yet-unknown focus.

The striving is

comprehensive in structure in that it is a striving for camprehension.

It is an effort to grasp the particulars subsidiarily

rather than focally, to grasp them not as facts but as clues to
the desired insight.

The more successful one is in grasping

these particulars as clues the more they will point htm toward
the solution.

There are moments of subconscious activity be-

cause there are moments when all activity is at a subsidiary
level far below the point of focus.

Furthermore, the ability to

sense the nearness of a solution and to invent operations which
will bring the solution nearer is a matter of "Skill, It for it
deals with subsidiary elements many of which cannot be singled
out explicitly.

Finally, the center of concentration is the

yet-unknown focus of integration, for in concentrating on this
empty focus one is able to grasp the various particulars subsidiarily as clues to insight which is yet to come •
••• even though we have never met the solution we have a
conception of it in the same sense as we have a conception
of a forgotten name. By directing our attention on a
focus in which we are subsidiarily aware of all the
particulars that remind us of the forgotten name J we form
a conception of it; and likewise, by fixing our attention
on a focus in which we are subsidiarily aware of the data
by which the solution of a problem is determined, we form
a conception of this solution. The admoaition to look at
the unknown really means that we should look at the known
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data, not,however, in themselves, but as clues to the
'ii'iikiiown:as ~ointersto it and t!ar"tSoTit. Wes'bou{d
make every-e fort to 1eer-our-way to an understanding of
the manner in which these known particulars hang together
both mutually and with the unknown. Thus we make sure
that the unknown is really there, essentially determined
by what Is known about it, and able to satisfy all the
demands made on it by the problem. l
Discovery:
A problem is seen.

A heuristic effort is begun.

Then

sooner or later, expected or unexpected, discovery comes.

There

is the joyful release from the tension which accompanied the
problem.

Understanding has replaced puzzlement, and the mind

has achieved a new vision of reality.
nature

o~

this moment of discover)'?

What precisely is the
How does this act of the

mind differ from others?
Once a person has solved a problem, he will never again
be puzzled by it in the same way_

Faced with the same or simi-

lar circumstances he will easily grasp their meaning.

There

will be no problem, no tension, no heuristic effort, no agonize
waiting, no joy of discovery in understanding the circumstances
involved.

In this sense discovery is quite different from any

systematic activity, such as adding a
tabulating items on a grocery counter.
lIbido

col\~n

of figures or

Such systematic activi-
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ties can be performed deliberately according to an explicit set
of rules.

The second and third performances of a systematic

vity are not significantly different from the first.

act~

They re-

quire the same amount of effort, the same concentration, the same
t~e,

and they produce the same results and the same minor satia.

faction.

In this sense Polanyi speaks of systematic activity as

reversible and discovery as irreversible.

A systematic activity

can be traced back to its beginnings and performed again, and
there is no significant difference in the acts performed.

Dis-

covery cannot be traced back to its beginnings, for it began in
puzzlement which cannot be reproduced, and it proceeded by an unspecifiable heuristic effort, not by systematic steps which can
be reproduced at will.
This irreversible character of heuristic acts is tmportant.
It suggests that no solution of a problem can be accredited
as a discovery if it is achieved by a procedure foll~iing
definite rules. For such a procedure would be reversible
in the sense that it could be traced back stepwise to its
beginning and repeated once more any number of tDmes, like
any arithmetical computation. Accordingly, any strictly
formalized procedure would also be excluded as a means
of achieving discovery.l
Discovery is unique among mental activities in that ic 1nvolves the attainment of a new view of reality, or at least a new
view of some aspect of reality.
lIbid. 92-93.

The new idea is one which was iQ
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no

way

implied in previously known ideas.

discovery as crossing a. Hlogical gap. H

Thus Polanyi speaks of

The logic of the old wa.y

of looking at things was inca.pable of arrlvlna a.t the discovery.
Rather the discovery brings with it a new way of looking at
things, with its own logic.
Established rules of inference offer public paths lor
drawins intell1&ent conclusiooa from existing knowledge.
The pioneer mind wilich reaches its own distinctive conclusions by crossina a logical gap deviates from the commonly accepted process of reasoning, to achieve surprising
results. Sucb an act is or1g1nal in the sense of maklng
a new start, and the capacity for initiat:1n~ it is the glft
of or1g1nality, a gift possessed by a small minority.l
The bridging of a logical gap comes out clearly in the discovery of an inventor.

An iavention 1s not sf.mply

something new.

There aro new cars and new models of appliances coming out each
year.

Tbey are sl1ghtly different. perhaps significantly dif-

.ferent from old models; but they are not inventions. for they do
not represent an entirely new idea, a new way of think1ng which
was 110t implied in the old way of tMnkins.

something new and or:l.ainal.

invention 1s

The inventor bas achieved something

that could not have been predicted.
intelligence.

An

It is a creation of his

Tberefore, it belongs to 111m :tn a special way_

new model of a ear is an improvement on older models, but it is

A
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not entirely the product of the designer's intelligence in the
sense that an invention is.

When the law recognizes that some-

thing is an invention, that an individual has produced this thing
himself, it considers the invention as belonging to that individual and recognizes this

ot~ership

in the form of a patent.

~vidth of the logical gap crossed by an inventor is sub ...
ject to legal assessment. Courts of law are called upon to
decide ~mether the ingenuity displayed in a suggested technical improvement is high enough to warrant its legal
recognition as an invention, or is merely a routine improvement, achieved by the application of known rules of
the art. The invention must be acknm~ledged to be. unpredictable, a quality which is assessed by the intensity of
the surprise it might reasonably have aroused. This unexpectedness corresponds preCisely to the presence of a
logical gap between the antecedent knowledge from which the
inventor started and the consequent discovery at which he
arrived. l

The

Great discoveries are the work of genius and ordina117 discoveries are the work of intelligent men, but there are minor
acts of discovery scattered all through the every-day life of
ordinary people.

Facing new situations and new problems, and

adapting one's language to meet these new situations, are examples of such day-to-day discoveries: "Admittedly, there are
minor heuristic acts within the power of ordinary intelligence
and indeed continuous tdth the adaptive capacities of life
to its lowest levels.

lIbid.

The interpretative frame't>1ork of the

d~~
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educated mind is ever ready to meet somewhat novel

exp~riences

and to deal with them in a somewhat novel manner."l
It remains to see discovery within the structure of comprehension.

In the problem stage a number of elements began to

be grasped subsidiarily as clues to a yet-unknown.

The heuristic

effort brought a gradual approach toward the solution, by integrating these elements more and more toward a still-empty focus.
Finally, in the moment of discovery, the integration is completed
and the focus leaps into view for the first time.

With this new

integration a logical gap is crossed and a new vision of reality
is achieved.

The

precis~

nature of the logical gap can perhaps

be seen in the difference between subsidiary and focal knowledge.
The various elements were known individually and focally prior to
the rise of the problem.

This focal knowledge of the individual

elements could never have led systematically or logically to
their integration as subsidiary elements of a new and original
focus.

Only the heuristic effort and the act of discovery, a
,

tacit and original achievement of intelligence, could cross such
a logical gap, integrate the elements subsidiarily to a new focal
understanding, and thus attain a new view of reality_
Verification:
1
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The discovery emerges from the heuristic effort accompanied
by the conviction that it is true.

The problem itself, as was

seen earlier, posited the existence of a solution and brought
with it a pre-conception of that solution.

During the heuristic

effort the sOlution was brought closer and closer.

Now, as that

solution emerges, it emerges as an existing and true solution to
the problem: "Therefore, as it emerges in response to our search
for something we believe to be there, discovery, or supposed discovery, will always came to us with the conviction of its being
true..

It arrives accredited in advance by the heuristic craving

which evoked it.ttl
Thus the solution does not emerge in discovery as one possible hypothesis, one among a myriad of possibilities.

Rather

it emerges from the elements that were in-need-of-explanation and
it emeries as the explanation of those elements.

It comes as

satisfying and as deserving acceptance, and the person who experiences the discovery receives it as something to which he is
committed.

Thus something

s~ilar

to verification has already

begun in seeing the problem, in the heuristic effort, and in the
discovery.

Strict verification will carry this process further,

but it is not essentially different in nature from the processes
lIbido 101.
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which have been going on.

It is basically rooted in the same

"skill" which founds the ability to see a problem, sense the
approach of a solution, and come up with a discovery.

Similarly,

because it is rooted in skill verification will be characterized
by an element of unspecifiability and will be ultimately a tacit
activity.
Verification attempts to assess the bearing of a theory on
experience.

The more one finds his theory applicable to and

capable of explaining experience, the more he becomes convinced
of its truth.

However, the bearing of a theory on reality is

only partially specifiable.

Much of the testing of a theory

will be accomplished tacitly and subsidiarily, for many of the
elements on which the theory bears can only be known subsidiarilye

Verification will attempt to explicitate as many of these

elements as possible, and then will go on to explicitate the
theory's relation to these elements.

However, there are limits

to the possibilities of this explicit verification.

Those ele-

ments which remain subsidiary, which have been tacitly integrated
in terms of the theory as their focus, and which cannot be adequately explicitated, these have a claim to truth, and thus to
"verity," because they have been satisfactorily integrated by
the skilful activity of intelligence.

Thus verification is in-
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complete, and is rooted in a skilful and tacit activity which
claims validity because it satisfies its own built in standards.
A theory is "verified," but the skill in which it is rooted is
only "validated" by continual satisfactory performance.
In different areas of knowledge, there will be different
combinations of verification and validation.

Verification is

most proper to strict science; while areas such as art, interpersonal knowledge, and religion must be to a large extend validated.
The acceptance of different kinds of articulate systems as
mental dwelling places is arrived at by a process of gradual appreciation, and all these acceptances depend to some
extent on the content of relevant experiences; but the
bearing of natural science on facts of experience is much
more specific than that of mathematics, religion or the
various arts. It is justifiable, therefore, to speak·of
the verification of science by experience in a sense which
would not apply to other articulate systems. The process
by which other systems than science are tested and finally
accepted may be called, by contrast, a process of validation.
But everywhere, even in the strictest sciences, verification is
rooted in validation.

Verification is rooted in skill.

The ex-

plicit 1s rooted in the tacit. And the whole is a comprehensive
achievement.

IPolanyi, Personal Knowledse, 202.

IV.

BELIEF

Modern man is unprecedented; yet we must now go back to St.
Augustine to restore the balance of our cognitive powers.
In the fourth century A.D. St. Augustine brought the histor,
of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first
time a post-critical philosophy. He taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, for which we must strive under
the guidance of an~ec~der.t halief: nisi credideritis, non
intelligitis. His doctrine ruled tli'iliiinds of ChrIstian
scholars foi a thousand years. Then faith decoined and
demonstrable knowledge gained superiority.l
For Polanyi all knowledge is rooted in belief (though he is
not speaking of a supernatural faith like Augustine's).

Just as

knowledge is not able to be fully explicitated, neither is it
able to be fully demonstrated.

There always exists an ultimate

range of beliefs, rooted in one's own activity, language, and
culture, which found the demonstration of individual acts of
knowing_

These ultimate beliefs cannot themselves be demon-

strated, but are accepted as the objects of a personally held
commitment.

Thus the ultimate reason one must give for holding

any piece of knowledge is "because I believe it to be so."
Polanyi feels that an adequate philosophy must acknowledge explicitly this fiduciary foundation of all knowledge, if it is
lIbido 266.
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goinl to avoid the danger of setting up a false ideal of knowledge.
Positivism is the prime example of a philosophy which has
refused to acknowledge tho fiduciary found4tions of all.knowing.
As a result there was erected the ideal of a completely detached,
impersonal, and scientific

objectlvlty~

The desirable thing was

to remove the subject as much as possible from knowledge, and tbus
achieve universal validity through a machine. like objectivity.
Positivism conceives science, the only valid form of lQlowledge,
as based on completely demonstrable fact:
The philosophy-to.end-all-philosophy may be designated, if
somewhat loosely, 4S pOSitivism. It coatinued in the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries the rebellion against
the authority of the Christian cburches first started in
the days of Montaigne. Bacon aad Descartes. But the movement set out not only to liberate reason from enslavement
by authority, but also to dispose of all traditionally
guld1n& ideas. 80 far as they are not demonstrable by
science ••• In this light, justice, morality, custom and law
appear as mere aets of conventions t eha.rged wf.th emotional.
approval, which are the proper study of sociology. Con ...
science 1s identified with the fear of breaking SOCially ap
proved conventions, aud its Investlgatlon 1s assigned to
peycholosy. Aeatheticvaluse are related to an equllibrlu.
of opposed impulses 1n the rwrvOU$ system I)f the beholder. 1
Unc!er the guidance of such concepts one is r:!ltpected to be-

come truly detached and objective 1n approachtna the whole world,
including one's

s~lf

and the affairs of men.

Polany1 upholds the

IM1chael Polanri."Th. Nature of Scientific Coavictiona,"
14.
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fiduciary foundations of all

kno~~ng

in opposition to this posi-

tivistic ideal of a completely demonstrable knowledge.

The point

of the present chapter will be to outline Polanyi's defense of be
lief and see how belief fits into the comprehensive structure of
knowing.
Different Systems of Belief:
There exist in the modern world a number of radically different systems or sets of belief.

Po1anyi would associate him-

self with the set of beliefs embodied in the Western tradition
and in modern science.

From this vantage point he sees a number

of other systems of belief which in many instances contradict his

own.

Examples of such conflicting beliefs are those of Marxism,

astrology, or the beliefs of current prtmitives in witch-craft,
sorcery. and oracles.

For the purposes of this chapter it will be

preferable to narrow the examination and investigate the contrast
between the beliefs of modern science (with which Polany! associates

h~self)

and those of the Zande Indians in oracles.

The Zande submit questions to the oracle. then administer a
substance called "benge" to a specially chosen bird.

The "benge"

is administered in prescribed doses and accQapanied by special
incantations.

By observing the condition of the bird. as it

chances after being given the benge, the Zande are able to inter-
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pret the measase of the oracle.

This whole ritual and the belief

in its efficaciousness is embodied in the tradition of the ZaDde.
This particular belief is part of a whole system of beliefs, and

within that system bas an tmporeeptiblc eaanection and influence
&mODI many other of their beliefs.
support one another; and

OV~

All of these beliefs mutually

the years thG belief in the oracle,

alons with their other beliefs, havQ (at least to the satisfaction of the ZaDde) baen confirmed by experience.

Modern science, of course, eaaily eliscovered that llbenge"
is a natural POiaOll.

~ben

administered tc a fowl in small dos.a

it will perceptibly ch.a.n,ge his health, but usually will not kill

him.

Thus science believes the Zandc to be miltakon in their be-

lief in the oracle.

FuX'tMrcaore, they can point to tests which

will faulfy this belief by prov1n,g

b~nge

to be a natural poison.

Such proof. however, does not interest the Zande.

Polany1 gakaa

refereuce to the findings of Evans-Pr1tcllard in examin1n6 the
Zande belief in oracles:
He often asked Azud.e what would happen if they were to
adminlster oracle-polson (benge) to a fowl without deliveriOi an address, 01: if they were to administer an extra portion of poiSon to a fowl whlch bas recovered frca the usual
doses. The Zandc -- be says -- does not know wbat l.;ould
happen and 1. not iDt.ere.ted in what would happen; DO one
has been fool cnough to waste good oracle-polson in making
such poiDtle.. exper!menta whicb 0111,. a Europe_ could
1ma&1ne. Indeed, were a. European to make a test whicb in
h1a view proved Zand.e o,loioo wrq they would stand _ _ad
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at the credulity of the European. If the fowl died they
would stmply say that it was not good benge, the very fact
of the fowl dying being proof of this. l
This introduces the further point ~ not only is the Azallde
uniterested in performing experiments which might falsify his belief in the poison-oracle, but aetually no experiment could be
performed which would convince him of the falseness of the
oracle.
view,

Any experimental evidence, seen from the Zande point of

CaD

be either explained

irrelevant.

m~y

or ignored as negligible and

This deserves elaboration.

Any objection to the Zande belief in the poison-oracle or
any experimental evidence against it can be met one hy one.

If

a large dose of poison is administered to the bird and it dies,
the zenda DUSt decide how to interpret this happening.

If the

Zande were facin! this situation without any preconceptions,

COUl-

pletely detached from any view of the world or system of heliefs.
they might well suspect that tbe benge was a natural poison.

However, the individual case of the death of this bird is seen
against the background of their
lief in the oracle.

wb~le

tradition and cultural be-

This particular instance 1s seen in the con-

text of the thousand of past instances which have been inter.
4tichael Polanyl,"The Stability of Beliefs,tt The British
Journal for the Pbilosoph~ of Scienee, III (November, 1§525,

220-221.
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preted in terms of their belief.

In such a context, this individ.

ual instance can only be interpreted as a case of bad benge.

The

bird died, not because benge is a natural poison, but because the
benge selected was not good benge.

This instance is not seen as

weakening belief in the oracle; rather, because the oracle is
accepted as true and the

beng~

accepted as an oracular substance

,and not poison, the death of the bird "proves" that the benge was
Ilot good bense.

Not only would such an instance not weaken the

Zande system of belief; but, on the contrary, by being interpreted
in terms of that system it would constitute one more piece of
evidence conf1rmin& the belief in the oracle.
Not only does the force of the traditional belief have the
power to outweigh any objections which can be considered one-by.

one; but the Zande will have alternative secondary explanations
for any instances which seem to fall outside their belief in the

oracle.

One example of this was interpreting the above instance

as a ca.e of bad benge rather than interpreting benge as a natural poison.

Other possible secondary explanations mi&ht be: "that

the bird was sick before the betl8e was administered,ff or "tha.t the

rites had not been properly

perforn~d

while administering the

benge." Thus the Zande beliefs gradually grow into a well-knit
and self-consistent system, more or less impregnable to the force
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of evidence which would refute the system.

Individuals livina

within such a cultural framework have little chance of setting
themselves free from this set of

b~.~liefs.

They are embodied 1n

the language they speak and the interpretation of the world which
has been taught them since childhood.

Furthermore. from the time

they be!in to think, they think from within their language and
their culture and in communication with other men Who share their
beliefs.

Thus each day's thought and activity will serve to

strengthen the "evidence" for these beliefs.
The crucial question must now be faced: "how is this phenomenon of the Zande beliefs to be interpreted?" This is not to
ask whether the belief in poison-oracles 1s true or false.

Even

1f this particular Zande belief is accepted as false, the ques-

tion remains whether the whole process by which the Zande built
up a system of beliefs and interpreted new instances from within

that system of beliefs is basically valid or invalid.

Positivism

would suggest that the Zande have been led into error becauss
they were careless.
"open mind. tf

A man must approach new evidence with an

He must not alloll his belief 11.1 a certain inter-

pretat1.OD of the ,;t1orld "bias" him against the import of new evi ...

dence.

Positivism would go on to claim that the success of

science 18 precisely due to its ability to be "disinterested"
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and "impersonal U in its approach to fact.

Thus rather than

"interpret fact 1n terms of its beliefs," it succeeds in udeDlOD_
strating" knowledge by observable "fact." Polany1 would, of
course, disagree with this positivistic interpretation of
science.

Science may have developed a more accurate scientific

skill; its eonclusion that benge is a natural poison may be

"true" and the Zande belief in oracles ufalse;" however, the
trit~h

of seienee is not due to its willin!ne.. to be detached

from belief or its refusal to interpret fact 11.'1 teras of belief.

At this point it will be helpful to examine Polanyi's attitude
toward scienee more closely.
Science and Belief:
Science takes place in a cODIIlUnity.

Tne members of this

community have been trained in the skills necessary to conduct
research, appraise the value of problema, get new aod relevant
idea., carry out experimental verifications, etc.

This

COlaU-

nity, through a cooperative effort, gradually builds a body of

commonly accepted theories.

The body of theory not only applies

to the limited areas i1.'l whicb it bas been verified. but constitutes a network of belief in terms of which scientists interpret
reality.

New facts are seen 1n the light of current scientific

beliefs.

New problems for. within thes. beliefs.

These prob-
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lema are appraised by the criterion of this current scientific
opinion.

Discoveries are made out of the background of this

framework of belief.

Finally, evidence for verification is

found and interpreted in the light of the.e beliefs.
Thus the basic structure of knowledse working within the
context of belief is present in science jUflt as it was found to
be present in the Zande beliefs in oracles.

Science does not

obsene "pure fact" from a detached viewpoint any more than the
Zande do.

Scientists consider facts

c~~·~~t u~lentiflc

belief.

fr~

within the framework of

Prom thls standpoint, with its in-

herent bias, they decide whether facts are important and relevant, whether they are worth a closer study or are to be ignored.
Polanyl outlines a few historical examples which bring out his
point.
1) In june of 1947, Lord Rayleigh, a distinguished fellow
of the Royal Society, published a paper (in Proceedings of the
Royal Society) describing

SOrDe

simple experiments which proved

in the author's opinion that a hydrogen atom impinging on a metal
wire could transmit to it energies ranging up to 100 electronvolts.

Polanyi points out that if such an observation were cor...

rect it would be of revoluti0D4ry importance.

Yet when the paper

came out :SC ientists in general would not believe in the theory.
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Though they could not explain the results, they did not think it
worth while even to repeat the experiment.
it.

They simply ignored

Since then Lord Rayleigh has died and the matter seems to

have been completely forgotten.

Po18nyi attributes this neglect

to the incompatibility of the proposed

th~ory

with current beliefs

regarding the nature of atomic processes. 1
Stmultaneously with Rayleigh's paper, another paper was
published by Professor P.M.S. Blackett.

He pOinted out a simple

relationship which exists between angular" momentum and stellar
magnetism as applicable to the earth. the sun and a third star.
This communication was meagre as compared with Rayleigh's.

None-

theless,
it was received by scientists as an important discovery
,
justifying further exploration.
Po18nyi claims that thirty years earlier the reactf.ons to
these two papers would have been shrugged aside as just one more
curious numerical coincidence.
observation would have been

On the other hand, Lord Rayleigh's

accept~d

at face value, since it

would not have stood in contradlctio,: to aeeepted beliefs. 2
2) Another example occurred itl the early 1900's.

Arrhenius

had postulated a chemical equilibrium between the dissociated and
1Polanyi. -'The Nature of Scientific Convictions," 16.

2 Ibid • 17.

18
the undissociated forms of an electrolyte in solution.

From the

very beginniq the measurements showed that this equilibrium was

true for weak electrolytes like acetic acid. but not for the prom

inent group of strona electrolytes, like common salt or sulphuric
acid.

For

80me

30 years theae discrepancies

weTa

tabulated, yet

no one thouaht of qtlestionir-a the theory which they

50

flagrantly

contradicted:

Scientists were satisfied with apeaking of the uanomali~8
strona electrolytes ... without doubting for a moment that

0

their behaviour was in fact governed by the law that they
completely failed to obey. I can still remember my own
amazement when, about 1919, I first heard the idea mooted
that the anomalies were to be reaarded .s a refutation of
the laws postulated by Arrhenius and to be explained by a.
different theory. Not until this alternative conceptlon
(baaed on the mutual eletrostatic interaction of the ions)
wa. successfully elaborated in detail, was the previOUS

theory generally abandoned. l

Po1any1 points out that contradict1ons to scientific theory
are often disposed of by calli. them "anomaUea."

Theae contra-

dictiona are thus explained away or 1Itaore4 because they are con-

sidered unimportant or Dealiaible.

This process is similar to

the way the zande explain away contradictions to their belief in

oracles.

Such a procedure is not only a fact in science, but

very otten proves justified when nanomalies" are explained by a

IPolanyi, ''The Stabili.ty of Beliefs," 228.
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subsequent re-interpretation of the original theory.l
3) Some years ago there appeared in Nature a table of
figures proving with a great deal of accuracy that the time of
gestation of a number of animals is a multiple of the number

•

However. an exact relationship of this kind makes no impression
on the moc1ern scientist, and no conceivable amount of further

evidence would convince htm of such a relationship.

Polanyi

points out that the rejection of such a relationship expresses a
comparatively recent belief of science.

He suggests that a

scientist like Kepler would by no means have relarded it as absurd. 2

4) Polanyi indicates that beliefs will be held in the face
of

strong contradictory evidence, even when the belief is still

in a very hypothetical stage.

The positivistic idea that a

scientist drops a hypothesis the moment it conflicts with experience is pure myth.

No true scientist would act in so clumsy

a manner.
Niels pf)~): did not drop his th~ory of spectra, which was
confirmed only by one sinale type of atom -- that of hydrosen -- and broke down at the very next step, when applied

-2Micbael Palanyl, "Scientific Beliefs,
lIbid. 228-229.

tober, 1950), 34.

It
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to heltm. The periodic system of elements could be fitted
into it only in the reverse sequence of their atomic
weights. Chemistry held on firmly to the cyclic formula of
benzene proposed by Kekule in 1859, even though it became
clear, as the years passed by, that the two different disubstituted derivatives which it postulated did not, in
fact, exist •. Scientists will often tolerate such contradictions to their theory, regarding them as anomalied ••••
The SCientist's decision depends on the strength of the
beliefs in the light of which he interprets his observations II and we approve of this decision if we share these
beliefs. 1
Thus Polanyi would conclude that all knowledge, whether it
be carried on by a scientist or an Azande, takes place 10 a context of belief.
of belief.
text.

Fact and evidence are interpreted in the light

Discovery and verification are carried on in this con

Science can disagree with the Zande belief in oracles. but

it cannot quarrel with the process by which the lande build up a
system of beliefs and carry

011

their activity of knowing within

the framework of their beliefs.

For science exhibits a similar

process in its own knowing.
The A-Critical Nature of Belief:
The previous comparison of the beliefs of lande and of
Science has suggested that the process of knowiDg takes place
always within a framework of belief.

One does not attempt to

pursue knowledge from a detached pOint of view; but be uses
lIbid. 29-30.
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his language, his skills, his tradition, and the assistance of hie
cODIIlunity in attempting discovery, verification, demonstration or
criticism.

Since the critical movement in Imowledge must itself

be pursued from within such a framework of belief, the beliefs

themselves stand outside that critical movement.
that belief is looked upon as a-critical.

Thus it follows

This section will ex-

amine the a-critical nature of belief more closely.

The a-critical element comes out moat clearly in the area
of language.

\~1en

one talks about the i4eather, he concentrates

upon what be ia aay1n& about the weather.

However, in speaking

he ia using a very complicated system of lanauage which baa been
developed over the centuries, contains an implicit theory of the
universe, and must be used accordina to certain rules.

The

speaker is not concentratina on any of these elements as he discourses about the weather.

He does not consider the complicated

system he is usina nor the fact that it has been handed down to

him from earlier generations.

He

does not think. at the moment.

of its contaioing an implied view of the universe nor does he .ak
htmaelf about the correctness of that interpretation of the universe.

He does not reflect upon the fact that even the catego-

ries he is usina to describe the weather have been given him by
his language.

He does Dot consciously consider the grammatical
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rules which guide sentence structure nor the meanings of individual words, as he construc.ts sentences and uses wo'rds. to speak
of the weather.

In all this he concentrates upon the weather and

what he wishes to say about it, and everything else forms the
framework of belief from within which he

vie,~s

the '+"eather.

In

this instance the framework of belief is obviously used a-critically.
However, it is PQssible for one to reflect upon bis own
activity and speak precisely of the various elements that make up
the framework of belief.

One

CaD

speak of his lanauaae. of 'r....

matical rules, of his own use of those rules.
reflection can be critical.

Furthermore, this

That is, one can, after uttering a

sentence, ask himself whether he used his languase correctly in
utterlQ& the sentence.

Or one could ask in reflection whether

the lanauaae he used to describe a given situation was actually
adequate to tlmt situation.

One might decide that it is

neces~

eary to find a new symbolic sy.tea to apeak adequately of the
situation..

However. the very act of deciding that a new symbol-

ism is required to handle a particular problem, will be done in
terms of words and a lanauage which form
for this act.

&

framework of belief

There i. no end to the amount of critical reflec-

tion which can be attempted. nor is there any element in the
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linguistic framework of belief which cannot be reflected upon
critically; however,that very critical reflection must have its
own framework of belief.

It is

~possible

to step entirely out-

side of a framework of belief, to become completely detached.

For

the unfolding of the mind, even the most critical unfolding of the
mind, requires a language in ter.ms of which it unfolds, and this
language forms a framework of belief.
So long as we use a certain language, all questions that we
can ask will have to be f~lated in it and will thereby
confirm the theory of the universe which is implied in the
vocabulary and structure of the languqe. It follows that
we cannot state without self-contradiction within a language
any doubt in respect to the theory implied by the language.
The only way to dissent from the theory of the universe
implied in a language i8 to abandon some of its vocabulary
and to learn to speak a new language instead. l
A skill is similarly part of the a-critical framework of
belief.

Take the instance of the gOlfer.

As he concentrates

upon hitting the ball, he skilfully uses his muscles, Sight, and
touch - ... and these form what could be called a framework of belief for bis activity.

Now even in an activity like golf there

can be a type of critical reflection.

One can discover that he

is not holding his left arm straight or that he is taking his eye
off the ball.

In fact with tlle help of a good coach, the slight-

est detail can be brought to a person' attention.
........
lPolanyi, "Stability of Beliefs," 221-222.

It may be pos-
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sible then for the golfer to work on this point, to give it more
of his attention.

Ult~tely

this correcting process will be

somewhat artificial and he will eventually have to come to the
pOint where these activities can be performed correctly without
concentrating on them.

However, even when he is concentrating on

correcting one element of his skill, he must rely on the other
elements taking care of themselves.

They now form the framework

of belief within which he attempts to correct one or another flaw
in his skill.

It is not possible for him to be critically aware

of all the elements of his skill as he performs them.

And even if

it were conceivable to reflect critically upon all the elements

of one skill; other skills would be put to use in the process -skills of perception, reflection, and judgment -- and these skills
~~uld

form the framework of belief for the critical activity.

As

in the case of language, it is impossible to step entirely outside
the context of skill even when one is critically examining one's
skill.
Basically, it must be acknowledged, that all unfolding of
human activity and human knowing takes place within a framework 01
belief.

The framework is used a-critically.

Even critical activ.

ity must take place in such an a-critical framework.

It is logi-

cally impossible to have a complete critical awareness of the

85

unfolding of one's own activity at the moment when the unfolding
takes place.

Such an attempt could only lead to the destruction

of meaningfulness •

••• The present moment's belief can be rejected or modified
by the next moment t s reflection, but this reflection, and
its result, will be again an ultimate commitment, which 80
far cannot have yet become the object of reflection or
c:.'iticlsm. But cCllJlldtment must have duration. Any attempt
to accompany it simultaneously by reflection i8 logically
self-contradictory, and if we perSist, it results in the
disintegration of our person. If we cannot lose ourselves
at all, but feel compelled to observe ourselves in all we
do, we become disembodied in the manner which Sartra has
penetratingly described •••• The result 1s not a superior
de~ee of detachment, but an impotent nihilism. l
Belie~

and_..C~e!leDfd,on:

It only remains to situate belief within the structure of
"comprehension. It All knowln& and all activity are mgulated by a
tacit skill which integrated subsidiary elements in terms of a
focus.

Subsidiary elements are not

y~

directly, 10 themselves;

but they are interiorized and known in terms of a foeal unity.
By interiorizinc subsidiary elements one "dwells within" them to

know their focal integration.

A person dwells prtmarily within

his own body, to know thinas other than htmaelf.
within his lanauage and his tools. as

~xtensiODS

And he dwells
of his body t to

attain more sophisticated knowledge and more skilful activity.

IPolanyi, tiThe Nature of Scientific Convictions," 22.
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The language of one t s culture and the tools and other subsidiary elements 'l:mich are interiorized in various knowing activities form a framework of beliefs.

One dwells tdthio these be-

liefs in interpreting the t<1Orld, in choosing fruitful problems,
in working toward a solution, in arriving at a discovery, or in
the

mor~

critical type of reflection and verification.

In all

these activities the mind unfolds by integratina subsidiary elements.

It unfolds in terms of language and skill.

It unfolds

by dwelling within certain elements in order to know their inte-

gration.

It unfolds a-critically, from within its beliefs.

Thus the subsidiary framework, from within which one attempts to know, constitutes always a framework of belief.

This

framework of belief is a-critical because it 1s known subsidiaril,
and integrated tacitly.

The framework of belief is fundamental

to all knowing, for all kftO\'ling is achieved by dwelling within
subsidiary elements and all lcnm4ing proceeds by integrating these
subsidiary elements tacitly_

The idea of a completely detached

knowledge would be one which did not integrate subsidiary elements, which had no subsidiary framework, no :1.nteriorlzation J no

indwelling.

If it is true that all knowing is comprehensive in

structure. tben it is equally true that all knowledge is founded
in belief, and there is no sucb thing as a completely detached
and i.mperaonal objectivity.

v.

COMPREHENSION AND THE MODERN AGE.

The first four chapters of this paper have examined the
nature of comprehension, its structure, its fundamentally a-critical character, the

1~1ts

of the critical element, and the various

types of knowing that are integrated into it.

This final chapter

will attempt to examine Polanyi's idea of comprehension in relation to one of the major problems of the age, namely the tendency
toward nihilism.

There are two general areas where this nihilis-

tic tendency has been most evident: 1) religion and morality,
where doubt is cast upon traditional values and beliefs; 2) the
arts and social sciences whose meaninl is destroyed by an overly
strict imposition of the methodology and ideals of the physical
sciences.
1) There has grown up in the age since the scientific revolution a conflict between science and religion.

If one were to

look for an historical symbol it might well be found in the Galileo incident; however, the conflict runs much deeper than any incidents that can be pointed to.
been a conflict of authority.

Polanyi points out that it has
"In medieval times you could sbat-

ter an opinion on the grounds that it was contrary to religion,
87
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just as today you can do so by showing that it is contrary to
science.

The reason is obviously that the authority of religion

has been tmpaired by the principle of doubt, while that of science
has been rather increased by it."l
This "principle of doubt" Polaoyi links with a critical and
mechanistic movement which he traces all the way back to the
Greeks. 2 This movement has appeared in many forms over the cen~
turies, but its basic principles can be stated briefly:

It

claims to accept only such beliefs as are founded on reason and
experience.

It seeks to eliminate error by the vigilant search-

light of doubt.

And finally it is passionately hostile to uncrit-

ically held beliefs, which it regards as cources of superstition
and fanaticism. 3
Thus it is not science itself which is fundamentally responsible for the deposition of relision's authority, but rather this
critical movement which has somehow been identified with science
in the present ace.

Science is held to be the outcome and supreme

justification of this critical method, and thus there is the tendlMichael Polanyi, "Science and Faith," Question, 5 (Winter,
1952), 23.
2I bld. 18.
3Ibld.
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ency to measure the validity of all other knowledge and belief by
its conformity or lack of conformity with the methodolosy of the
physical sciences.
The shadow of doubt which first passed over religion has
also passed over the realm of philosophy and thus has undermined
the claims of morality.
When the modern positivist says of a statement that it is
metaphysical he means that it is nonsense. For the past
fifty years it has been hammered into us with ever increasing vigour that science is concerned only with verifiable
statements and must be purified of all other elements, which
are mere metaphysics. Viennese school of philosophy has
generalized this principle into a universal critique of human utterances. It points out for example that if you say
that it is wrong to bear false witness, you find that you
have made a statement which cannot be proved by the facts.
No chemical analysis or microscopic examination can prove
that a man who bears false witness is immoral. Hence to
call him immoral is either meaningless or no more than an
exclamation of disgust, such as one may utter when biting
at a worm inside an apple. l
2) This critical movement and the tendency toward nihilism
~ich

~ealms

is beginning to emerae from it has also penetrated the
of the social sciences and art.

If an historian is lauded

on the grounds that his work is truly scientific, this will be accepted as a relevant term of praise.
strive to be scientific.

The historian will thus

An educator, criticized on the grounds

that his method is unscientific will consider this a dispar8lalIbid. 24.
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ment.

Often students of man will make desparate efforts to appear

scientific, and some paycholol1sts have turned away from the stud,
of conaciousness in order to become truly scientific.

The econo-

mist 1s constantly worried about doubts .s to whether economics 1.
really a science.

The usual way of dealing with this problem is

to claim that these are still "young" sciences.

The

implication

is that as they mature they will come to resemble physics more
more.

Physics is thus

acl~led&ed

aae

as the only truly exact sci-

ence, one which i8 strictly verifiable. 1
MOdern art and music have felt the touch of the nibi1istic
destruction of meaning.

Both have arisen rebelliously as a de-

liberate rejection of socially accepted standards.

This ase bas

become so used to the spectacle that its uniqueness is seldom
averted

t~.

Great artists of other ases have often sone unrecoI-

nized in their lifetime; however, never before bas a whole artistic culture gone on flowering through successive lenerations in
.ystematic opposition.

It is Polanyi' s contention that they can ...

not move indefinitely in this direction.
MOderD art baa arisen fra. a persistently continued destruction of ex1atiqg artistic realities for the sake of
penetrating to strata of harder. more genUin e fcmu of
reality. So the "poetic" bas vanished from our poetry, the
npicturesque" from our painting, the "harmonious" from our
IIbid. 25.
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music, the heroes and heroines from our novels and plays.
All these were rejected in the pursuit of a harsher artisti
truth. But can this process go on indefinitely? Must it
not presently lead to a complete destruction of meaning?l
This then
the age.

is Polanyi's

analysis of the central problem of

The critical movement, which has been productive of so

much good, is threatening now to lead to nihilism and the destruc
tion of reality:
The critical imperative of rejecting any belief that can
quite conceivably be doubted 114s become second nature with
us. To assert any belief uncritically as a matter of our
faith has come to be regarded as an offense against reason.
We feel in it the menace of obscurantism and of an authoritarian restriction of free thou&ht. Belief 1~ science is
the only belief left ~~ich ~re still feel entitled to hold
on these grounds. So we are compelled to transpose all the
rest of our beliefs into scientific teachings and ~4here
this proves impossibl~ we try at least to dress them up as
teachings of science.
It is possible to translate this crisis of the age into
terms of "comprehension." Fundamentally, the critical movement
has not realized that all knowledge is comprehensive in character

and thus is always rooted in subsidiary "beliefs."

It has not

apprehended tbat knowledge is a tacit activity of integration.
Ideas 11ke tacit and subsidiary knawing ar.e something of a scandal to it.

It wants everything to be verifiable in the sense

lrolanyi, "History and Hope," l5-16.
2po lanyi, "Science and Faith," 30.
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that the evidence for any position is explicit and focal.
What is needed is a conceptual renewal which grasps knowledge as an act of comprehension, rooted in tacit and subsidiary
knowing.

The critical element must be seen as itself an act of

comprehension, and thus in principle always limited in effectiveness, always incomplete, always capable, in excess, of leading to
the destruction of meaning.
What we have to do now seems to me quite obvious. We must
get rid of the obsession which forbids us to believe anything that we could conceivably doubt. The critical movement which we inherited from Greece has brought us inuooasurable benefit through the past centuries. It was the
battle-axe of intellectual honesty, of free thouaht and of
lndependent personality. But the beneflts of this movement
are nearing exhaustion while its dangers are &rowina fast.
In the west it has forced u. into an intellectual masquerade, a pretense of a scientific justification of our beliefs J which weakens and debauches them. In the East it
has reached its logical terminus in a combination of nihilist theory and fanatical action. l
~~e V!n~catlon

of

Real~tl:

The first half of this chapter has examined the age's tendency toward nihilism, toward the dest.ruction of meaning, and thus
toward the destruction of reality.

It has so exhalted physical

science that it haa reduced all other reality to the level of
physical reality.
lIbid. 34-35.

Everything can be explained in terms of atomic
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theory, and anything that cannot is not real.
physical and chemical reality.

Thus man is a

To speak of him as a conscious

being, a moral beins, or a religious being is to be mystical or
metaphorical, it is not to speak of reality.
The second half of the chapter will go on to show bow Polanyi, 1n affirming knowledge as comprehension, vindicate. a
reality of various levels -- physics, engineering, biology,
psychology, morality, religion.

The difference between physics

and engineering, and the levels of reality with which they deal)
will be explained as an instance of bow the theory of comprehension leads to a vindication of a many-leveled reality.
It is Polanyi's contention that scientific analysis and the
critical movement destroy higher levels of reality by reducing
them to their focal particulars.

The higher levels consist of

comprehensive entities wh1ch can ooly be grasped by taking the
particulars of lower levels subsidiari1y in comprehending the
higher levels.

An instance on taking the particulars of a lower

level focally makes it tropossible to grasp the comprehensive
realities of a higher level.
My vindication of reality will consist in showing that the
universe is in fact such that my conception of knowing is
appropriate to it; that there do in fact exist higher
levels of reality composed by comprehensive entities, which
include prinCiples that are absent in the lower levels of
reality composed of the kind of particulars which contriD-
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ute to the comprehensive entities. This is why, by relying on our awareness of the particulars situated on a
lower level of reality, we can apprehend the comprehensive
entities on a hig;her level of reality, but cease to see
the.se if \M desist from using our powers of comprehension
and loOk instead at the particulars in themselves. We
shall vindicate reality by repudiating the obsession of
scientific rationaliSf with tangible particulars which
leads to Itbsurdities.
Take the instance of a machine (the object of the science
of engineering), for example, a typewriter, cart watch or clock.
A

machine i8 defined in terms of its operational principles.

These principles state the purpose of machine -- the function of
its parts as they interact to achieve some purpose.

If a machine

is a reality, it is a reality wil1ch must be defined in terms of
its operational principles.
If YOll have an idea for a new machine you will define it
in the terBS of its operational prinCiples and you may
claim a patent founded on this description of it. In applying for a patent you will carefully avoid any reference
to material of which you have made such a machine, or
think it would be best made; for if you do this, your
patent could be circumvented by a competitor making your
machine from some other material. You would, in fact,
have failed to define in all its generality the class of
objects comprised by the conception of your mechine. 2
If one were to eonsider the parts of a machine in themselves. as inanimate objects of the science of physics, he could
lPolanyi, "History and Hope," 48-49.

-

2Ibid. 50.
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never arrive at the operational principles of the machine.

Take

a machine apart and a110'\.'/ a. team of physicists to examine its
parts in great detail in terms of their science of physics.

They

will never be able to tell in terms of physics whether the object
Is a

machine~

and if so,

TI1hat

purpose it serves and bow.

Thus

they will never grasp the operational prinCiples lihich define the
machine.

The particulars, lvhich they are taking focally to com..

prebend the atomic structures of these objects, must be grasped
subsidiarily to comprehend the operational principles of the
machine.
The operational prinCiples define a machi.ne in terms of it.
purpose.

Thus in terms of the operational principles one can

decide when a machine has failed to achieve its purpose.

How-

ever, the operational principles themselves cannot explain the

cause of the failure to achieve its purpose.

'Ibis must be dis ...

covered on a lower level.
To understand these failures of a machine we must descend
to an enquiry on the lower level formed by the parts of the
machine, as mere inanimate bodies. In other words, we must
call 10 physics and chemistry and examine the parts by the
methods of these sciences. But this must be a peculiar
kind of physics and chemistry: a use of physics and chemistry expressly bearing on the operational principles of the
machine. In this ancillary role, whicb is called t!Plied
Phxsics and Chemist!i' these sciences caa supply t
Inlormatr-on-neeessarily nored by the operational principles of
a machine. This is how engineers use physical and chemical
investigations for establishing opttmal conditions for the
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cons;~-::-uet:1on

and working of a

avoid its breakdown. l

machint~

and for learning to

Thus two different branches of science refer to these two
levels within a machine.

Engineering studies the machine as a

machine. that is in terms of its operational principles.

Pure

physics might study the parts of the machine, but this study
would have no relation to the machine as a machine.

An

applied

physics can study the parts of the machine in relation ot its
operational principles, in the sense that it studies the optimal
conditions for the workins of those principles.
Thus a machine can only be known by relying on the subsidi-

ary awareness of its particulars to grasp comprehensively ita
operational principles.

To refuse to attempt this act of com-

prehenSion, to approach a machine analytically and critically,
attending focally to tts more tangible particulars, ia to fail
to grasp this higher level of reality_

To vindicate the various

levels of reality from physics to relis1·t.ml one must uphold tacit
and subsidiary knowing, as well as explicit and focal knowing.
One must give to each of these its proper place within theinte.
sral structure of comprehension.

By doing this Polanyi enables

the age once again to affirm the full richness of a mult11eveled

· .... .....
"
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reality

alon~

'.Jith

~.he Intall\.~etual 41'\d

cultural values which are

part of its tradition.
Modem m:m 18 'Jl'lprecedented; yet we muat now go back to St.

Augu$tine to restore the balance of our cognitive powers.
In the fourth century A.D. St. Augustine brought tbe bistoe,
of Greek philosophy to close by inaugurating for the firat

time a po8t-01:1t1041 phl1oaopb),.. He tauaht tbat all know...
leq_ was a gUt of grace, for which we must strive UDder
the au1dance of .Dteeedent belief: Hiai Cred.14erltis. Hoa
~Dtel..1.!Il~s.. • ..... We
now l'ecOiihi bille! oace _e
as
source of all kDOWlecae. Tacit a$$$Dt ao4 iDtellec.
tual pasalO1U:; the ahal'lng of aD 1dica ad of a cultural
heritage, affiliation to 4 lUte-minded community: such are
the impulses which shape out' vision of the nature of thins_

ate'

tne

on whiob we rely for our .'tery of th1Q&s.

however cr1tica.1

ft

fiduciary framework.

PW,

"

ITl

,

yriS1Dal,

..,

No lntell1&eraoa.

caD operate outside such a

II

..
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